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Witnessing Officer Serial #/Address Dept. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT: 
1. You are hereby summoned to appear before the Clerk of the Magrstrate's Court of the 1 vt nictrirt ~ n t  t+  nf BLAINE f i t  tnkr HAlUEY 
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TIME FIRST OBSERLrED , 
ental Report fr! WPD2008-00118 
THE DISTHCT COURT OF THE 5th WDIC DISTIRXCT OF THE 
STATE OF fDAHO, IN AlXD li'OR THE COUP1I'TY OF BLAINE. 
1.  I am a peace officer employed by-e D- 
THE STATE OF IBMO, 
Plaintiff, 
State:-ON 
State of Idaho, 
County of RT *m 
2. ?%e defendant was arrested on February 17,2008 at 1 :28 m AM [J PM for the crime of driving or in 
physical control of any vehcle while under the mfluence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxication substances in a 
public location or on private property open to the public. 
COURT CASE NUM&ER 
PROBPLBLE CAUSE mFIDAVTT rrJ SUPPORT 
OF EST 
SS 
3. Location of Occurrence: MAIN STREET AND EMPTY SADDLE 
I, GARTH W. DAVIS, the undersigned, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say that: 
4. Identified the defendant as: (name) flBBaLEY-a, GREEN by: (check box) 
a ~ i l i t a r ~  ID DState ID Card n ~ t u d e n t  ID Card m ~ r i v e r s  License m ~ r e d i t  Cards 
C]~a~erwork  found Cf~e rba l  ID by defendant 
Witness: identified defendant. 
Other: 
5. The crime was committed in my presence. @ Yes / No 
6. I believe that there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed such crime because of the following 
facts: (NOTE: You must state the source of all information provided below. State what you observed and what 
you learned from someone else, identifying that person) 
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR STOP AND ARREST: 
B y e s  C]  No On February 17.2008 at ap~roximately 0106 hours, I was uarked on the west side of North Main 
Street bv Granite Lane facine southbound. I observed a grey 2008 Pontiac Torrent (California license 
#6AKW508) traveling northbound on Main Street. I estimated the speed of the Pontiac at 40 miles per hour (rnuh) 
rnha8~i.S RcJpawaCouse. 
Page 1 of 3 
for that s~eed .  
SFST7s to Creen arain and he rehried. Green then asked what he was going to be required to do. I explained the 
tests involved in SFST's and Green stated he could not do any of the test because he recently had surnerv on his 
knee. I infomed G r m  I would take that into consideration and we could do outional tests. Green once again 
stated he refused to do the tests, until be spoke to a lawer.  I once a ~ a i n  explained to Green he was not allowed an 
attorney d ~ n g  SFST's. f then asked Green again if he would like to do SFST's or if he refused the tests. Green 
stated he would not do the test until he had a lawyer present. 
I then ulaced Green under arrest for Driving under the Influence and rehsina evidentiary testing. I instructed 
Green to tum around and place his hands behind his back. Green refused to pull his hands out of his pockets. I 
once again asked Green to place his hands behind his back and he refused. I then grabbed Green's arm and he 
attempted to turn around to strike me. I placed Green against my patrol vehicle and Sergeant Stewart assisted me 
in handcuffing Green. 
I transported Green to the Blaine County Jail to test his Blood Alcohol Level on the Intoxilvzer 5000. Upon arrival 
I b e m  my 15 minute observation period at 0 139 hours. I ula~ed the ALS audio tape for Green. While the audio 
taue was playing, Green kwt stating he wanted his attorney here to coach him on how to pass the test. I explained 
to Green he was not allowed an attornev at this point in time. After the audio tape had finished, Green stated he 
did not understand. I then read and ex~lained the Notice of Suspension Form to Green. Green stated he still did 
not understand and wanted to call his lawyer to ask him what he needed to do. I once again explained to Green he 
was not allowed an attorney at this time. Green then stated he still did not understand the Notice of Suspension. I 
read the ALS Notice of Suspension Form to Green two more times and asked Green if he wanted to continue. 
Green stated he would not take the test d e s s  he had a witness. I told Green I could ask a Blaine County Jail 
Deputy to come into the room. Green stated he wanted his attorney to witness and coach him throunh the test. I 
explained to Green that this was not possible at this time. I then asked Green if he wanted to continue with the 
testi. ng or if he was refusing. Green stated he did not want to take the test without his l a m  present and refused to 
continue. Green's refused at 0203 hours. 
I: then filed for a Blood Warrant and while wait in^ for approval I placed Green into the conference room. Green 
stated he wanted a drink of water and some food. I escorted Green to the drinkinn fountain to p;et some water. 
When we returned to the conference room Green attempted to strike me with his elbow. 
After approval of the Blood Warrant, I transported Green to St. Luke's Hospital at 0255 hours. Upon arrival I 
placed Green into the room designated by the hospital staff. I instructed Green to sit on the bed while we waited 
for a certified lab techcian to draw blood. Green asked to see the warrant and a copy was made and handed to 
him to read. Green stated he refused to do the blood draw until he spoke to his lawyer. I explained to Green that a 
judge had signed the warrant and blood would be drawn. Green then attempted to leave the room and I was forced 
to place h m  back onto the bed. Javne Black, a Medical Technician., came into the room and drew blood for the 
warrant. 
Page 2 bf 3 7 
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Odor of alcoholic beverage 
ng alcoholic beverage 
Slurred speech 




Walk & Turn 
One Leg Stand 
Accident Involved 
hjury 
Dmgs Suspected D y e s  N N o  Drug Recognition Evaluation Perfumed n ~ e s   NO 
Reason Drugs are Suspected: 
Defendant was tested for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances. Prior to testing, defendant 
was substantially infomed of the consequences of refusal and failure ofethe test as required by Section 18-8002 
and 18-8002A, Idaho Code. The test(s) waslwere performed in compliance with Sections 18-8003 & 18-8004(4), 
Idaho Code and the standards and methods adopted by the Department of Law Edorcment. 
BACEFFT JISAL by: U ~ r e a t h  Instrument Type: @Intoxilyzer 5000 ( r l ~ l c o  Sensor Serial#: 
m ~ l o o d  AND/OR C]~r ine  Test Results Pending? H y e s  No (Attached) N ~ e f u s a l  
Second or more D.U.I. oEense in last 10 years? a y e s  No 
Name of person administering breath test: Date c a t i f i c a t l o n  
expires:04/30/2008 
By my signature and in the presence of a person authorized to administer Oaths in the State of Idaho, I hereby 
s o l d y  swear that the information contained in this document and associated reports and docments included 
herein and made a part hereof is true and correct to the best of my informatjmupd belief. 
Dated: 7./17/~1)08 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on 2 (7 - @ B  
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Fif+h Judicial District Court, State of ldahn 
$& In and For the County of Blaine $$:2 
"-L*" 
201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 106 .Sew - 
Halley, Idaho 83333 
r"' STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
Pia~ntiE 1 FEB 2; 5 2008 k 
VS. ) i 
Bradiey D Green 
PO Box 460 
Kirkland, WA 98033 
DOB: 
DL or SSN: 
j Case NO: CR-2008-00003 I o 
-r cL/.pr.,C.a 




NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Request for BAC Wednesday, March 12,2008 01:30 PM 
Judge: R. Ted Israel 
Pretrial Conference Monday, March 24, 2008 02:00 PM 
Judge: R. Ted Israel 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and 
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Monday, 
February 25, 2008. 
Defendant: Bradley D Green 
Mailed L/ Hand Delivered 
Private Counsel: Mailed L/" Hand Delivered 
Brian E. Elkins 
P.O. Box 766 
Ketchum ID 83340 
Prosecutor: Frederick C. Allington 
Mailed Hand Delivered L' 
FAILURE TO APPEAR FOR THIS SCHEDULED HEARING MAY RESULT IN THE ISSUANCE OF A BENCH 
WARRANT. 
Dated: Monday, February 25, 2008 
Judge 
llOCZZ 7/96.. . 
Fifth Judicial Dir~eict Court, State of Ldaho 
In and For the County of Blaine 
201 2nd Avenue South, S u b  106 
Hafley, Idaho 83333 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
Pla~ntiff. ) d' 
VS. ) Case No: CR-2008-0000310 
1 P 
Bradley D Green 
PO Box 460 
Kirkland, WA 98033 
1 D Jim Thomas, County P.A. 
f O Angela Nelson, County P.A. 
1 , D Matt Fredback, County P.A. 
I 
1 
b ~ r e d e r i c k  Alfington, City P.A. 
Defendant. k t t o r n e y  
DOB: ) 
DL or SSN: ) 'YS Defendant 
D Interpreter 
Date Counter 1 : 33 CD 

IN THE DISTRZCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA'IX OF IDAHO, IN FOR COUNTY OF BLAIbE 
IN TI33 M T T E R  OF THE 1 
SUSPENSION OF THE DRIVER'S 1 
LICENSE OF 1 
BRADLEY D. GREEN, 1 Case No. CV-2008-0000 160 
1 
1 Case No. CR-2008-00003 10 
BRADLEY D. GREEN, 1 
1 ORDER DISMISSING 
Petitioner, 1 BAC EFUSAL 
v. 1 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 
Respondent. 1 
The Petitioner's motion to dismiss the pending BAC refusal proceeding brought under 
Idaho Code § 18-8002(4)(b) came before the Court on the 12' day of March, 2008 with the 
Petitioner being represented by his attorney of record, Brian E. Elkins, and the State being 
represented by Frederick C. Allington, City of Hailey Misdemeanor Prosecuting Attorney. 
UThereupon, counsel for the Petitioner recited the facts pertinent to this issue which were 
stipulated to, and agreed upon, by the prosecuting attorney. Those facts can be summarized as 
follows: 
The Petitioner was in actual physical control of the motor vehicle at approximately 1 :06 
a.m. on February 17,2008 and was stopped for speeding for traveling 38 miles per hour in a 25 
mile per hour zone. The stop of Mr. Green's vehicle was made within the corporate city limits of 
ORDER DISMISSING BAC REFUSAL -\ Page I 
the city of Hailey by Hailey Police Officer Garth Davis. Upon contacting Mr. Green, Deputy 
Davis noticed the order of an alcoholic beverage emitting from Mr. Creen, that his eyes appeared 
to be red and glassy and bloodshot, that his speech was slurred and that Mx. Green admitted to 
having one drink earlier that evening. 
Mr. Creen identified himself to Deputy Davis by way of a Washington driver's license. 
Defenbt ' s  Extribit A also indicates in the Uniform Citation Issued to Mr. Green that he 
possesses a Washington driver's license, GREEMD332NB. 
The Petitioner requested that he be allowed to discuss what was required of him before 
s u b ~ t t i n g  to field sobriety tests, which was not allowed by Officer Davis and Mr. Green was 
ultimately amested for driving while under the influence of alcohol. He was taken into custody 
by Of'ficer Davis, then transported a short distance to the Blaine County Sheriffs Department. 
Once there, hk. Green was played an audio tape that recited the information contained in the 
Notice of Suspension Advisory Form admitted into evidence as Defendant7 s Exhibit B ("'NOS 
Form7'). Officer Davis also read the NOS form two additional times to Mr. Green and when 
requested to submit to a breath test, Mr. Green once again requested that he be allowed to obtain 
legal advice before submitting to the test. 
Officer Green inputted the data into the Intoxilyzer 5000EN machine at the Blaine 
County Sheriff's Department with information depicted on Defendant's Exhibit A. Ultimately, 
the breath test machine "timed out" and a print card was generated indicating that Mr. Green had 
refused to continue. 
Thereafier, Officer Green went about obtaining a blood warrant which was secured and a 
blood draw was conducted at the St. Luke's Medical Center in Ketchum at approximately 3:30 
a.m. on February 17,2008. 
An Affidavit of Probable Cause in Support of Arrest was filed by Officer Davis and 
though the offrcer did not file an affidavit of refusal, it does provide in the Probable Cause 
Affidavit that a box was checked indicating a refusal. Additionally, the NOS form is marked as a 
refusal. 
The Petitioner timely filed a Special Notice of Appearance and requested a BAC hearing 
under Idaho Code § 18-8002(4)(b) and, at the same time, filed a Motion to Dismiss. 
Attached to the Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss are a series of orders not only issued by 
this Court, but also this Court's predecessor where the NOS form has been reviewed and 
ORDER DISMISSING BAC REFUSAL-/L Page 2 
scrutinized since Jan 2000. Those decisiom a d  the analysis and basis for the Court's ruling 
in this case are incorporated by reference herein. 
More recently, this Court once again reviewed the latest edition of the NOS form that was 
the subject of a s i ~ l a r  motion to dismiss In the Mutter ofthe Suspension ofthe Driver's License 
ofMatilda F. Kling, Blaine County Case No. CV-07-1034fCR-07-3609, wEch added the 
following lmgmge In paragraph 4.B of the NOS form which previously had only appeared in 
pasagaph 5.A. of the NOS fom: 'Won-resident licenses will not be seized and will be valid in 
Idaho for 30 days from the service of this notice of suspension unless modified or restricted by 
the court, provided the license is valid in the issuing state." 
As decided in the Kling case, this Court continues with its ruling that the slight 
modification of the NOS forin does not cure the defects and mbipi t ies  of the NOS form with 
respect to out-of-state licensed drivers. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss BAC Refusal Proceedings 
is HEREBY GRANTED and this matter is dismissed. The Petitioner's driving privileges that 
were granted and existed through his Washington driver's license on February 17,2008 are 
reinstated. 
The Petitioner reserves the right to raise any other issue with respect to an Idaho Code 
§ 18-8002(4)(b) proceeding in the event this order is subsequently vacated. 
DATED this day of March, 2008. 
h 
R. TED I S M L  
Magistrate Judge 
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CERnFICATE OF SERVICE 
I mmBS CERXFV that on the day oENmch, 2008, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing docment, to be delivered to the f o l l o e g  in the method marked herein: 
Mailed 
Hmd-Delivered 
Faxed to 208-788-790 1 
and mailed 
Frederick C. AIlington 
City Prosecuting Attorney 
1 15 2nd Avenue South 
Hailey, ID 83333 
/ Mailed Brian E. E l b s  
Hand-Delivered Attorney at La-7 
Faxed to Fax Nwber  P. 0. Box 766 
Ketchurn, ID 83340 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
Pla~ntlff, 
VS 
Bradley D Green 
Defendant 
6- d4P fE& 
% "&< &$. "a14 i FILED FIFTH JUDlCIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF IDAHO 
COUZu'TY OF BLAINE, MAGISTUTE DIVISION i --l 
The above-named partles hereby stlpuiate and agree as folfows 
i *- -I -.A Cler:, D~slnct 1 PRE-TRIAL STIPULATION ~ f l g % ~ , , ~  igeha 
I L.:_ ..A 
) Case No. CR-200&-00003 10 
1 
1 
The Defendant will plead guilty as charged to 
The State moves to dismiss thc charge(s) of because 
The parties have agreed to the following amendments, 
[ ] COURT TRIAL is set for at 
(By signing this document, all parties expressly agree to waiver of a jury trial.) 
[ ] JURY PRE-TRIAL is set for at. 2:00 p.m. 
with JURY TRIAL set for at 9:00 a.m. 
[ ] The State recommends the following sentence: 
THE DEFENDANT IS NOTIFIED that: 
1 .  If' you fail to appear at any time noted herein, any bond posted may be forfeited and a warrant may be issued for your arrest. 
2. In agreeing to plead guilty, you waive all statutory and constitutional rights provi 
legal counsel. 
3. Sentenci g reco mendations are not binding on the court unless ex 
DATED: 3[ L-'\T 0% 
Bradley D Green 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Stipulation of the Parties is: [ d p p r o v e d  ( J Disapproved. 
SENTENCING (if applicable) is SET FOR at 
48 hours prior to Sentencing, Defendant must provide Court with: [ ] Substance abuse evaluation /.-\ [ ] Domes I Vlolence Evaluation 
A I - h' 
7 4i 
FIFTH DISTRICT MAGISTRATE JUDGE # 
Copies hand-delivered to: Prosecuting Attorney Defense Attorney [ ] Defendant 
By: 
BRIm E. E L m S ,  P.G. 
Attorney at Law 
208 Spruce Avenue North 
P. 0. Box 766 
Ketchm, Idaho 83340 
Telephone (208) 726-4338 
Facsimile (208) 726-9328 
E-mail: bee&ns@cox.net 
ISB No. 3 150 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DIS'IRICT COURT OF THEi FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE S T A E  OF IDAHO, ZN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, 1 Case No. CR-2008-00003 10 
v. 
) 
1 MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
1 
BRADLEY D. GREEN, 1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
COMES NOW, the above named Defendant, Bradley D. Green, by and through his 
attorney of record, Brian E. E b s ,  and moves this Court pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) for an order 
suppressing evidence obtained by Officer Garth Davis of the Hailey Police Department on the 
grounds that it was illegally obtained in violation of the Defendant's rights as guaranteed by the 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
comparable provisions of the Idaho Constitution and all case law interpreting the same. 
In general terms, but not limiting the Defendant thereto, based upon the discovery that has 
been provided to the Defendant, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is based upon the 
following: 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS- \ Page 1 
The Defenb t  Bradley D. Green (hereh&er referred to as "Green") was stopped by 
Hailey Police Oficer G d  Davis for speeding, Upon m h n g  conlact with Green, Off~cer Davis 
detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage emitting from Green, that his eyes appeared red, 
glassy and bloodshot, that his speech was slurred and that Green admitted to consming one 
drink earlier that evef ig .  Officer Davis requested that Green submit to roadside field 
maneuvers and when Green exited I s  vehicle to discuss the matter with Officer Davis, Oreen 
requested that he be allowed to comunicate with counsel to be advised on his rights and what to 
do. 
Officer Davis advised Green that under Idaho's implied consent statute, Green was 
obligated to consent to evidentiary testing and b t  he was not entitled to talk to a lawyer, Officer 
Davis advised Green fhat the field tests were Davis'choice for evidentiary testing for alcohol 
concentration. Green would not agree to perform the roadside maneuvers without counsel 
present and he was ultimately arrested, transported to Blaine County Sheriffs Department where 
he was subsequendy requested to submit to a breath test for determining alcohol concentration. 
As was the case during the roadside maneuvers, Green requested the opportunity to 
communicate with counsel but was advised by Officer Davis that under the implied consent 
statute he was not entitled to access with an attorney. Officer Davis cited Green with a BAC 
reha1  under Idaho Code $ 18-8002(4)(b)' and then applied for and received a blood warrant. 
According to the Idaho State Police Toxicology Submittal Form, Oreen's blood was 
d r a m  at 3:30 a.m. on February 17,2008. According to Officer Davis' report, he stopped Green 
at approximately 1 :06 a.m. Throughout this entire time up until Green's blood was seized, he 
requested the o p p o ~ Q  to speak with counsel. 
The Intoxilyzer 5000 print card shows that the machine timed out at 2:04 a.m. on 
February 17,2008. 
It is Green's position that he was entitled to consult with counsel during the roadside 
maneuver tests and that there is nothing in Idaho's implied consent law that prohibits that. 
Officer Davis was incorrect in the information that he conveyed to Green, telling him that he 
ISee, Order Dismissing BAC Refusal filed March 17,2008. 
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could not consult with an aaomey prior to the roadside tests. &anted, it m y  be that Been was 
not entitled to consult with an attorney during the breath te&g procedmes at the Blajne Comv 
ent but, ce-y, once he was chasged with a refusal at 2:04 a.m. he was 
entitled to consult with a lawyer and was entitled to be provided access to a telqhone to get that 
accomplished. 
In State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 18 1,911 P.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1995), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals held, in a similar simtion, that the police violated the defendant's due process rights by 
denying the defendant access to a telephone after an aaempt to ahinister a BRAC test. See, 
also, State v. Madden, 127 Idaho 894,908 P .2d 587 (Ct. App. 1995). As was the situation in 
Carr, Oreen was held in custody while critical evidence concerning his blood alcohol content 
was destroyed - or evaporated. 
The blood draw occurred approximately two and one-half hours after the act of driving 
and approximately one and one-half hours after Green allegedly refused to submit to a breath 
test. Oreen's due process rights were violated with respect to the destruction of this evidence 
when he could have been advised by counsel on whether to submit to the breath test or to seek 
his own independent test. The human body assimilates and eliminates alcohol over time and 
those rates of elimination vary between individuals. 
This motion is based upon the entire record in this matter and such W e r  documentary 
and testimanial evidence as may be offered at a hearing. The Defendant requests an evidentiary 
hearing and oral argument. 
DATED this& day of March, 2008. 
n 
/ 1 
BRIAN E. ELKINS 
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I m B B Y  CERTIFY that on the day of March, 2008,I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing docment to be delivered to the f o l l o h g  in the method marked herein: 
Hand-Delivered 
Faxed to 208-788-7901 
and mailed 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS- 4 
Frederick C. Allington 
City Prosecuting Attorney 
1 15 Znd Avenue South 
Wailey, ID 83333 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IBAl-10, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BMINE 
) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 Case No. CV2008-160 
) CR2008-310 
PlaintiffIAppelIant, 1 
) ORDER ON APPEAL PROCEDURE 
Vs . 1 PURSUANT TO 1,C.R- 54 
1 
BRADLEY GREEN, ) 
1 
WHEREAS, a Notice of Appeal was filed in the above-entitled case by State 
of Idaho, the PlaintifFJAppellant, on March 28,2008; and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(j), 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That the appeal and cross appeal, if any, shall be determined upon the 
record and not as a trial de novo. 
2. That a transcript of the record is necessary for disposition of the appeal 
In lieu of the transcript, the parties may, within seven (7) days from the date hereof, 
file a stipulation by all parties that such transcript is not necessary, or, if unable to 
so stipulate, the appellant or cross-appellant may file a motion that such transcript 
not be required. Said motion shall thereafter be placed upon the next Law and 
Motion Calendar following the filing thereof. 
3. That a transcript of the record of proceedings be prepared at the expense 
of the appellant. The appellant shall pay to the Court Reporter the estimated 
transcript fee of TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS ($200.00) within fourteen (14) days 
Order: on Appeai Procedure - 1 
from the date of this Order, Said transcript shall be prepared pursuant to 1.R.C.P- 
83(k). 
4. This appeal involves questions of fact and law 
5. The appeal is taken from the Magistrate's Order entered on or about 
March 17,2008. 
6. That appellant's opening brief shall be filed within thiw-five (35) days 
after the transcript has been settled pursuant to 1.R-C.P. 83(u) and I.A.R. 34. 
7. That should the requirement of a transcript be waived pursuant to 
paragraph 2, appellant's opening brief shall be filed within thirty-five (35) days after 
the entry of such stipulation or Court Order waiving such requirement. 
8. That respondent's reply brief, or upon cross-appeal, shall be filed within 
twenty-eight (28) days after the filing of appellant's opening brief. 
9. That appellant's rebuttal brief shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days 
after respondent's reply brief. 
10. That, within thirty (30) days after the filing of all briefs the matter shall 
either be submitted to the Court for decision upon written stipulation, or shall be 
brought on for hearing by either party at a regular law and motion day and in the 
same manner as a motion made pursuant to L.R.C.P. 12(b). 
11. That failure to comply with any of the terms of this Order, or any 
additional requirements of I.R.C.P. 83, shall constitute grounds for automatic 
dismissal of the appeal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(s). 
Order an AppeaLPracesiure - 2 
12. That, upon the filing of any appeal from the Magistrate's Division to the 
District Court, the Clerk of the District Court shall serve copies of this Order upon all 
parties or their amrneys and upon the trial court transcriber. 
DATED this 2 ~ ' ~  day of March, 2008. 
District judge 
Certificate of Service 
True and correct copies of the foregoing Order on Appeal Procedure Pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 83 were served as noted below: 
Rick C. Allington 
City Prosecuting Attorney 
115 2" dve. S. 
Hailey, ldaho 83333 
(United States Mail - Postage 
Prepaid) 
Brian Elkins 
PO Box 766 
Ketchum, ldaho 83340 
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(hand delivery) 
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Frederick C . Allington 
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Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Telephone: (208) 788-7802 
-Fax: (208) 788-7901 
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COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through Frederick C. Allmgton, the 
City Prosecuting Attorney, County of Blaine, State of Idaho, and pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 19-1909, moves to continue the Motion to Suppress hearing in the in the above 
entitled action set for April 9, 2008, to April 30, 2008, at p.m., as I will be out 
of town. I have spoken with Brian Elkins, the defense counsel, and he has no objections. 
DATED this day of April, 2008. A 
MOTION M43GBBER FOP CONTINUANCE - 1 
IN TBE DISTHCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTMCT 
OF THE STATE OF D M O ,  IN FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
MAGISTMTE DWISION 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS . 
BRADLEY G E E N  
F'; - 
I .  
Case No. CR-08-310 
O m E R  FOR 1 1 2008 
CONTWUANCE . - 
C .. .. . * 
Defendant, ! 
1 
Upon reading the foregoing motion and good cause appearing therefore, said 
.fen, 
action is hereby continued to the \ 4 day of)-lecl. 2008, at 2 : $.m. for a 
MOTION TO SUPESS hearing. 
DATED this 3 day of . ,2008. 
MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE - 2, 
I . .. - L ' -
MAY 1 4 2008 , . ..>I P 
I - - - 4 ...-
Jolynn Dram Clork Dtstrlcf 
Couf? ff/at& huntg  Idaho 1 3  
r 1 
W 
BRlAN E, ELKINS, P.G, 
Aaomey at Law 
208 Spntce Avenue North 
P. 0. Box 766 
Ketcbum, Idaho 83340 
Telephone (208) 726-4338 
Facsimile (208) 726-9328 
E-mail: beelkins@cox.net 
ISB No. 3150 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) 
Plaintiff, 1 Case No. CR-2008-00003 10 
) 
v. 1 DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM 
1 IN SUPPORT OF 
BRADLEY D. GREEN, ) MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
1 
Defendant. 1 
In his Motion to Suppress dated March 26,2008 the Defendant, Bradley D. Green 
(hereinafter referred to as "Green7') seeks an order from the Court suppressing evidence obtained 
by Officer Garth Davis of the Hailey Police Department (hereinafter referred to as "Officer 
Davis") based upon, basically, the fact that Officer Davis would not allow Green to communicate 
with counsel. The Defendant's theory is based upon a number of constitutional protections, as 
cited in his Motion to Suppress, but are based, primarily, on the Sixth Amendment and the due 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS - \ Page I 
process clause of the United States Constj~ution and comparable provisions of the Idaho 
Constit?ltion. 
This case stems from a traffic stop that Officer Davis conducted on Green on Februq  
17,2008 at approximately 1 :06 a.m. as h e n  was stopped for speeding, 3 8 in a 25 mile per hour 
zone, as he proceeded northbound on Main Street in the city of Bailey near the northem city 
limits of Hailey.' Green was driving a rental car and was driving some of the passengers to be 
dropped off at a motel located on Cobblestone Drive. 
Officer Davis testified that upon making initial contact with Green he could smell the 
odor of alcohol emiaing as Green spoke and noticed that Green's eyes were glassy and bloodshot 
and that his speech was slurred. M e n  asked by Officer Davis, Green admitted to having one 
drink at the Mint Bar earlier that evening. 
Once backup arrived at the scene, Officer Davis requested that Green turn off his vehicle 
and exit so that he could perform some roadside maneuvers commonly refemed to as field 
sobriety tests. Green would not agree to do that and immediately indicated that he wanted to 
have counsel present. Hearing that statement, Officer Davis informed Green f&at when he signed 
up for his driver's license he gave his implied consent to submit to evidentiary testing for alcohol 
and that he was not permitted to speak to an attorney. Green has a driver's license from the state 
of Washington. 
Officer Davis further informed Green that the tests that he was going to use for alcohol 
testing were the field sobriety tests.2 
lOfficer Davis testified that the Green vehicle stopped, in response to OfEcer Davis' 
overhead lights on Cobblestone Drive which is approximately one block south of McKercher 
Boulevard. 
ZThis incorrect information conveyed by Officer Davis to Green, in the Defendant's view, 
becomes important when assessing if the Defendant's due process rights have been violated in 
conjunction with Green's repeated request to speak to counsel and the confusion that was created 
when the Idaho Code $ 5  18-8002 and 18-8002A advisory tape was played to Green and the ensuing 
questions raised by Green. 
Field sobriety tests are not "evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol." See, Idaho 
Code 5 18-8002(1), Idaho's implied consent statute, which provides that evidentiary testing for 
alcohol concentration is "defined in Section 18-8004, Idaho Code." Idaho Code 5 18-8004(4) 
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Initially, when Officer Davis was requesting &een to pesom field tests, Green would 
respond by saying that he would be happy to perfom any tests once his counsel was present 
whereupon Officer Davis would advise that Green would not be permitted to commicate  witb 
an at-tomey . 
According to the digital audio recording of Officer Davis' interaction with Green shortly 
after the stop, at 1 :20 on the digital counter, or clock, Officer Davis advises Green that if he wiIl 
not perform the field sobriety tests he will be placed under arrest for refusal to take evidentiary 
tests.3 
Apparently, Green was placed under arrest by Officer Davis for, according to his 
statements, refitsing to submit to field sobriety tests. It is not clear if Green was placed under 
arrest for resisting or OEcer Davis' incorrect belief that Green could be arrested for refusing to 
submit to evidentiary testing-that being field sobriety testsf In any event, Green was taken into 
custody and thereafter transported a short distance to the Blaine County Sheriff's Department in 
Hailey . 
Once at the Blaine County SherifT's Department, Green was escorted into the room that 
houses the Intoxilyzer 5000EN breath testing machine and Officer Davis commenced the breath 
testing procedures. According to OEcer Davis, he started the so-called 15-minute waiting 
period at 1 :39 a.m. and played the audio tape that advises of the information contained in the 
Notice of Suspension Advisory Fonn (hereinafter referred to as the "NOS Form") the NOS Form 
which is on file with the G0u1-t.~ 
defines what an evidentiary test is for alcohol concentration and field sobriety tests do not qualify 
under the statute as an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration. 
IAgain, in Defendant's view, this statement by Officer Davis is contrary to Idaho law a;. it 
is not a criminal offense to refuse to submit to evidentiary testing. 
"See, the Uniform Citation issued in this case where Green was cited for "DUI Refusal" in 
violation of Idaho Code 5 18-8002(3) [sic] and Resisting in violation of Idaho Code 5 18-705. 
5Green requests that the Court take judicial notice of the NOS Form. 
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During the playing of the tape that recites the NOS Forrn there are nmerous discussions 
between Green and Officer Davis about the content. However, right before the playing of the 
tape on the NOS Form the same dialogue continued whereby Green did not want to do anything 
until counsel was present and, as before, Officer Davis advised Green that he was not entitled to 
counsel as would be explained on the tape of the NOS Form. 
Because of all the questions by Green during the playing of the tape on the NOS Form, 
Officer Davis decides to read through the NOS Form. Once Officer Davis reads paragraph 3 of 
the NOS Fonn wherein he advises Green that he does not have the right to talk to a lawyer before 
talung any evidentiary tests for alcohol concentration, Green and Officer Davis have a discussion 
about Green's confusion on why he cannot speak to an attorney as he had, apparently, been 
previously advised that if he ever got into such a situation to make sure that he ask to speak to a 
lawye? and thereafter Green asks what his rights were. Later on that same digital recording 
Green can be heard telling Officer Davis that if he ever got into such a situation that he had been 
advised to ask for ~ o u n s e l . ~  
These same discussions continue between Officer Davis and Green where Green asks for 
the right to talk to counsel. 
According to Officer Davis, Green refused to submit to the breath test at 2:03 a.m.8 
Officer Davis then advised Green that one way or another he was going to get Green to 
submit to a test and advised Green that he was going to get a blood draw and take him to the 
hospital. Officer Davis then went about applying for a search warrant which was issued by 
District Court Judge Robert J. Elgee and Green was transported to St. Luke's Hospital at 255 
a.m. Prior to being transported to St. Luke's, Green was held in a conference room at the Blaine 
County SherifPs Department and, although Officer Davis did not continue to record the 
6See, also, Track 1 of the digital audio recording at 7:50. 
7See, Track 1, digital audio recording at 12:35. 
'See, also, Intoxilyzer 5000EN printout card which notes the time that the "subject refused 
to continue" at 2:03 a.m. 
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proceedings, Green continued to request to talk to cownsel or request that counsel be present.. 
Clearly, once fie trreah testing procedwes were completed and e e e n  was charged with a rehsal 
at 2:03 a.m., Green was entitled to access to a telephone to make an effort to GO 
counsel. 
Up until the moment that blood was d r a m  at 3 :30 a.m., e e e n  conthued in his request to 
either speak to counsel or requested that counsel be present. 
After posting a bond, Green was released from jail at 4:40 a.m. 
II. ARGUMEfl. 
Idaho has three cases that d y z e  and discuss Idaho Code $ 1 8-8002(4)(d) which 
provides that the suspect may have additional testing done by a person of his or her own 
choosing and that reasonable means must be provided if requested by the driver. The first case 
on this is State v. Madden, 127 Idaho 894,908 P.2d 587 (Ct. App. 1995) where Madden agreed 
to submit: to a breath test after being arrested for DUI but after the first sample refused to give a 
second and she was cited for DU'I by the mesting oflicer. During the booking, however, 
Madden requested an independent blood test and a h d  to speak to her aRorney. The officer 
informed Madden that according to jail policy she would have to wait until booking procedures 
were completed to make any telephone calls. Madden was arrested at 11 :05 p.m. and, the 
opinion indicates, that at approximately 1 :00 a.m. the arresting officer received a call from a 
jailer advising that Madden wished to obtain a blood test whereupon the arresting officer 
informed the jailer that Madden would have to get to the hospital and arrange for the test herself. 
At approximately 2:30 a.m. and approximately three and one-half hours after she was 
originally stopped, and one-half hour after booking was completed, Madden was allowed to 
telephone her attorney. Immediately after speaking with her lawyer, Madden again requested a 
blood test and her attorney, Ketchurn's own Dan Dolan, also contacted the jailer and requested 
that Madden be transported to a hospital, which was five minutes away, for a test. The jailer then 
contacted the arresting officer to advise of the status and the arresting officer told the jailer that 
Madden could get a blood test after posting bond. 
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The opinion does not disclose when Madden was released from police custody on bail nor 
does it discuss wheher Madden ever made arrmgements for a blood draw. In Magistrate Court 
Madden filed a Motion to Suppress which was granted by Robert J. Elgee whereupon the State 
appealed the decision and District Court Judge James J. May reversed. On fixther appeal to the 
Idaho Court of Appeals, Madden argued that the State violated her statutory right to obtain an 
independent blood test as well as her right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. 
The Madden court noted language from the Idaho Supreme Court in Woolery, 1 16 Idaho 
368, that there is an "inherent exigency" that exists in DUI cases due to the destruction of 
evidence by the absorption and metabolism of alcohol in the blood by the human body. 
By refusing her access to a telephone for approximately two hours after her 
initial request for an independent test and three and one-half hours her arrest, 
the officers denied Madden a meaninghi and timely oppo-ty to make her 
own arrangements for an additional test. 
127 Idaho at 589. 
In its conclusion the Madden court said: 
Under the facts of this case, the Blaine County Sheriffs Department's policy 
prohibiting an arrestee from making a telephone call until after the booking 
process denied Madden a meaningm opportunity to obtain an additional BAC 
test pursuant to Idaho Code rj 18-8002(4)(d). Consequently, the results of the 
breath test were inadmissible and should have been suppressed. 
Id. at 590. 
The Madden court did not reach the constitutional Sixth Amendment claim being asserted 
by Madden and decided the case on a violation of the statute on her request for an independent 
test. Thus, as can be seen when comparing Madden to Green, the factual circumstances are a 
little different because it does not appear that Green specifically requested an independent test. 
The thrust of Green's situation is that he repeatedly requested counsel and an opportunity to 
speak to counsel up until he was released from custody. 
The next case decided by the Idaho Court of Appeals was issued, quite surprisingly, the 
same day, December 2 1, 1995, but was not released during a petition for review that was denied 
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on March 8, 1996. State v. Cavr, 128 Idaho 181, 91 1 P.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1996) involved a 
sirnation much closer to Green's case. Can was mested for drjving while under the iduence of 
alcohol and was trmsporrted to the poIice station. 
Before Officer MeLeod conducted an evidentiary breath test, and while 
he was reading the standard police advisory form aloud to her, C m  
requested access to a telephone in order to contact an attorney. 
Consistent with I. C ,  $ 18-8002(2), McLeod informed Can that she had 
no right to consult with an attorney prior to taking the breath test. 
McLeod also informed Carr that after taking the State's breath test, she 
could obtain an additional test at her own expense. Can agreed to take 
the breath test, which yielded results of .20 and .21. 
McLeod then took Carr into a holding cell during which time Carr asked 
when she could speak to an attorney. h4cLeod informed Carr that she 
could "make any phone calls as soon as the jail personnel were ready to 
let her make the phone calls." At some point, McLeod prepared the 
Uniform Citation, charging Carr with misdemeanor DUI, I. C. 5 18- 
8004(1). McLeod then departed and Carr made several requests of other 
officers to contact an attorney. The officers denied her requests. 
Approximately five hours after her arrest, Carr was permitted access to 
the telephone, and she contacted a bondsman. 
128 Idaho at 1 82. 
The opinion is silent as to whether Carr ever made contact with an attorney or made 
arrangements for some type of independent test. 
Carr filed a motion to dismiss the DUI charge based upon a violation of her Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights of the United States Constitution and that "[sJhe was denied the 
right to a fair trial." The magistrate denied the motion, Can entered a conditional guilty plea and 
the district court reversed. The case then proceeded to the Idaho Court of Appeals. 
The issue in Carr was whether her constitutional rights were violated when the State 
denied her request to telephone her attorney following the administration of the State's BAC test. 
(Emphasis in the opinion.) 
The Carr court distinguished Madden, noting that Carr had not specifically asserted her 
statutory right to an independent BAC test but, rather, the Carr case revolved around the issue of 
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whether she was den;ied the assismce of cowsel. The Carr court: agreed with the district courl's 
conclusions albeit the decision hinged primbly upon a due process violation: 
We agree with the district corn that the officers violated Carr's 
constitutional rights. However, we conclude that Cm' s  = w e n &  
regsrrding the denial of her right to gather exculpatory evidence and her 
right to a fair trial are essercllially due process claims, &though couched in 
terns of inte~erence with her ability to conbct counsel. We M e r  
conclude that Can was denied her right to due process under the 
Fourteen& Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Like Carr, Green was prevented from seeking advice on what to do with his situation and 
was entitled to be advised, shortly after the stop, whether to submit to field sobriety tests or 
submit to breath alcohol testing. However, once Green was placed under arrest and transported 
to the Blaine County SherifPs Department, under the statute and case law, he was not entitled to 
speak to a lawyer until the breath testing procedures were completed at 2:03 a.m. But, again, at 
that moment, Green should have been given the opportunity to speak to an attorney and be 
provided the reasonable means to do that so as to decide if he should change his mind and submit 
to a breath test or go about immediately seeking an independent blood test. The Carr case is 
clear that after the evidentiary BAC test, the "person must be allowed, at a minimurn, to make a 
telephone call upon request to do so." Id. at 184. F d e m o r e ,  as the Carr case indicates, an 
independent test is not limited to a blood test or breath test. 
In addition, as noted by Carr, the person contacted by the anestee could 
arrange for a photograph to be taken to demonstrate that the arrestee's 
eyes were not bloodshot but clear and white; prepare a tape recording to 
demonstrate that the anestee had clear speech; video tape the arrestee to 
show that he or she has balance and is able to walk in a straight line; 
perfom a gaze nystagmus test to show smooth eye pursuit at all angles; 
or simply serve as a witness to observe the aforementioned characteristics 
of sobri ety. As demonstrated, the interest affected in this case is 
substantial. 
The Carr court concluded that "By denying Can's request to telephone her attorney and 
holding her incommunicado for an unreasonable time following administration of the State's 
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BAC test, the Sate violated Carr's right to due process. Fuhemore,  we hold that suppression 
of the Sme3s BAG test was the appropriate remedy." Id. at 1 85.  
In a concdng  opinion, Judge Lansing took it further by stating that, based upon the 
same rationde, all other evidence of Carr's intoxication should be suppressed such as the 
officer's testimony regarding odor of alcohol, slurred speech, glassy and bloodshot eyes. That is 
what this Court: should do as well. 
The other case decided by the Idaho Court of Appeals is State v. Cantrell, 139 Idaho 409, 
80 P.3d 345 (2003) which does not appear to provide much assistance because the defendant 
never requested an independent test nor did he request to speak to an attorney. Rather, the 
argment in Cantrell was that his due process rights were violated because he was prevented 
from bailing out of jail until some four hours after he submitted to a breath test. 
11% CONCLUSION. 
Based upon tbe guidance of the Madden and Carr cases, and in particular the factual 
situation in Carr and its holding, it is apparent that Green's constitutional rights were violated 
based upon the Sixth Amendment and primarily the due process clause. Cited with approval in 
State v. Carr is Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wash.2d 733,409 P.2d 867 (1966), which is directly on 
point holding that a denial of a right to contact an attorney prevented the defendant's effective 
preparation of a defense because "evidence of intoxication dissipates with the passage of time." 
See, State v. Carr, 128 Idaho at 184. We urge the Court to follow the rationale of Judge Lansing 
in Carr and suppress not only the blood test results obtained by the State but also Officer Davis' 
alleged observations of odor of alcohol, glassy and bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. 
Lastly, the constitutional violations were not cured by the subsequent blood draw 
obtained by the State. Independent test means a test and opportunity to obtain exculpatory 
evidence by the accused, not with the knowledge or participation of the State. "The independent 
test acts as a safeguard which 'provides the licensee with the opportunity to test the sufficiency of 
the original test results, and avoid the consequences of an erroneous deprivation of his or her 
driving privileges. "' State v. Madden, supra; Matter of McNeely, 1 19 Idaho 1 82, 191, 804 P.2d 
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91 1, 920 (1 990); see, also, State v. Duniva~z, 65 Wa. App, 501 (1 992); Stale v. Olean, 6 1 P.3d 
475 (Ariz. 2003); Russell v. Munieipaliry ofAnchorage, 706 P.2d 687,681 (Ala. Ct. App. 1985); 
Anchorage v. Serrano, 649 P.2d 256 (Ala. Appellate 1982). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMInED this ! 9 day of May, 2008. 
CERTIFICA'II? OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of May, 2008, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method marked herein: 
Mailed Frederick C. AIlington 
/  and-~elivered City Prosecuting Attorney 
Faxed to 208-788-7901 1 15 2nd Avenue South 
and mailed Hailey, ID 83333 
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Date 511412008 
Time 0314 PM 
Page 1 of 3 
Fifth Judicial Dicrtrfct Court - Blains C;ounty 
Minutes Report 
Case: CR-200&-0000310 
Defendant: Green, Bcadiey D 
Selected items 
Wearing type: Motion To Suppress Minutes date: 0511 4E008 
Assigned judge: R. Ted Israel Start time: 02:00 PM 
Court reporter: 
Minutes clerk: Paige Trautwein 
End time: 02100 PM 
Audio tape number: 71 
Prosecutor: Frederick C. AILington 
Defense attorney: Brian E. Etkins 
Tape Counter 204 This cause came regularly before the Court this day for a Motion to Suppress hearing. 
The defendant appcjared, represented by Brian Elkins; the State was represented by Rick 
Allington. 
The Court introdumd this matter. 
The Parties were prepared to proceed. 
Tape Counter 204 Defendant's witness # I  Garth Davis of HPD I' sworn 
direct - Mr. Efkins 
Officer Davis reviewed his report prior to testimany today. 
Mr. Elkins established the employment history of the witness. 
The witness is POST certified and has received certification on the Intox. 
The Defendant prepared his report white fistening to the audio recording. 
The witness identified the dekndant as being in the courtroom today at the defendanfs 
table. 
Officer Davis looked through his paperwork and verified that he has not seen the motion 
to suppress filed by Mr. Elkins. 
Officer Davis verified his understanding of today's hearing. 
Feb. 77, 2008 was the date of this incident. Officer Davis was in Hailey Police Dept. 
uniform and stopped the defendant in the early am near Grannet street. This is the street 
on the South side of Albertsons. Officer Davis was facing South bound the the vehicle 
was traveling North bound at approx. 40 mph. Officer Davis was parked on North Main 
facing South. He effected a U-turn and pulled over the defendanfs vehicle. 
Date: 5/14/2008 
Time: 0334 PM 
Page 2 of 3 




Defendant: Green, Bradl@y D 
Selected Items 
Tape Counter. 21 1 The stop was effected on Cobblestone Street. Officer Davis made contact with the driver 
and could smell the odor of alcohol. The defendants eyes were glassy and red. The 
vehicle was a Pontiac and had four people total in it. Officer Davis knew the alcohol smell 
was coming from the defendant as he could smell it on his breath when me derfendant 
spoke. 
Officer Davis ran a license check and called for backup. Sgt. Stewart appeared as 
backup. 
The defendant had a WA drivers license. Officer Davis requested the dekndent perform 
field sobriety testing; the defendant questioned why he was being asked to do this. 
The defendant requested an attorney be present before he perform the tests. Offimr 
Dav~s told the defendant that he was no entitled to counsel due to the "implied consent 
law" signed by the defendant when he got his Idaho drivers license. 
Officer Davis still had possession of the defendants drivers license and requssted he exit 
his vehicle and perform field sobriety tests. Upon refusal to submit to evidmtiary testing, 
the defendant was arrested for a DUI. Officer Davis transported the defendant ta the 
Blaine Go. SheriWs Mtice. The two entered me intox room and the intox tap was played 
for the defendant. 
Defendant's exhibit A tape of stop offered I no obj. I admitted 
Tape Counter 220 The tape was published for the Court. ( Track 2 ) 
This part of the tape ended prior to transport. 
Tape Counter: 226 The tape began again at BCSO ( Track 1 ) in the intox room. 
Tape Counter 228 Court took a brief recess 
Tape Counter 230 Court resumed 
Tape continued ( Track 1 ) 
Tape Counter 256 Publ~shing of tape complete. 
Tape Counter 257 The Defendant was placed under arrest at 1:08 a.m. 
The Defendant was brought into jail at 1:39 a.m. 
The Defendant was charged with a refusal at 2:03 a.m. 
Officer Davis requested a blood draw warrant at this time, as the defendant refused to be 
tested and continued to insist on having a lawyer present. 
The defendant was taken to the hospital at 2:55 a.m to obtain a blood draw and test his 
BAC level. Blood was drawn at 3:33 a.m. 
Defendant's exhibit B; blood draw paperwork. offered I admitted 
The defendant was never given the chance to contact an attorney. Offtcer Davis believers 
he was not entitled to an attorney until after bonding out of jail. 
Date: 5/14/2008 
T~me: 03:14 PM 
Page 3 of 3 
Tape Counter: 31 1 
Fifth Judicial DisMct Court - BIalne County 
Minutes Report 
Case: CR-20084000310 
Defendant: Green, Btadley D 
Selected Items 
Uwr: PAGE 
Mr. Elkins requested the Court take Judicial Noticcr! that the defendant was released at 
440  a.m. 
Mr. Allington objected on the grounds that the bond does no show at what time the 
defendant was allowed to call a bondsman. 
Mr. Elkins set forth closing argument through a Memorsndum which he ff led in open court. 
The Court allowed Mr. Allington one week to respahd to Mr. Elkins memonndum. 
FREDERICK C. ALLINGTON 
Attorney at Law 
115  Second Avenue South 
Wailey, Idaho 83333 
Telephone: (208) 788-7802 
Fax: (208) 788-7901 
ISB# 4414 
IN THE DISTRIn COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 Case No. CR-08-310 
1 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 STATE'S MEMORANDUM 
VS. 1 
1 




An audiotape was published to the Court during the Notion to 
Suppress which includes most of the pertinent contact between the Green 
and officer Davis. 
ARGUMENT 
Under ldaho law, it is  settled that a person is  not entitled to an 
attorney prior to  submitting to  an evidentiary test. The Courts have held 
that the period prior to  submitting to  the test i s  investigatory and not a 
critical stage of the criminal proceeding. State v McNeely, 119 ldaho 182 
(Ct. App. 1990). The Defendant cites two  cases: State v Carr, 128 ldaho 
181 (Ct. App. 1996) and State v Madden, 127 Idaho 894 (Ct. App. 1995) 
for the proposition that he should have been allowed to contact his 
attorney after he had refused the offered breath test. 
The one distinguishing fact separating the present case from State 
v Carr, 128 Idaho 181 (Ct. App. 1996) and State v Madden, 127 ldaho 
894 (Ct. App. 1995) from Carr and Madden i s  the agreement by the 
motorists to submit to evidentiary testing. Green, on the other hand 
refused to submit to any testing. From the audiotape of the arrest and 
subsequent exchange in the intox room at the Blaine County Sheriff's 
Office, Green engaged in conduct designed to stall and prolong the 
attempt by Officer Davis to obtain a breath sample. 
In Madden and Carr, the suspects had submitted to evidentiary 
testing and once done, the officer's investigation was essentially 
complete. Green's, stall tactics delayed the process to such an extent, 
that by the time blood was drawn at the hospital, 2.5  hours had passed. 
Had Creen submitted to evidentiary testing as is  required by law, he 
would have had ample time to call his attorney, bond out and obtain an 
independent test1There is  no evidence in the record to suggest that 
officer Davis or the jail staff unreasonably delayed or denied Green his 
right to an attorney after the state was through with i t s  investigation. 
Moreover, there i s  no evidence in the record to suggest that Green 
Green was stopped at 1 :06 am and marked down as a refusal at 2:03. A blood wanant 
was obtained and it took an hour and a half (3:30 am) for the blood to be drawn. Green 
was bonded out at 4:30 am after being transported back to the jail from the hospital. 
requested an additional test. Therefore, the actions of Green were the 
principal cause of any delay and should not be attributed to the State. 
It simply does not make sense to require police (in the context of a 
DUI investigation) to allow a suspect to call their attorney before the 
investigation is over. This i s  especially true when the prolonging of the 
investigatory process is the fault of the suspect. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the aforementianed arguments, the Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress should be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2 1 s t  day of May, 2008. 
/ City w y  for Hailey 
Iherebycertifythatonthe a /  dayofMay,2008,1serveda 
true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document upon the 
attorney named below in the manner noted: 
Brian E. Elkins, Esq. 
Post Office Box 766 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
- By causing copies of the same to be deposited in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid, at the post office at Haiiey, Idaho. 
- By causing copies of the same to be hand delivered to  the office of 
the above attorney at his office located at 
__X- By causing copies of the same to be telecopied to said attorney at 
his teieco~ier number: 726-9328. A- 
IN THE DISTNCT COURT OF TEE FIFTH m I C I A L  DISTRSCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THEi COWTY OF BLA 
.a"- & 
//: 
MAGISTMTE DIVISION - kiz. 
STATE OF IDMO,  
) 
) CASE NO. CR-2008-03 10 Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRADLEY D. GWEN, 
Defendant. 
) M E M O U N D r n  DECISION and ORDER 
1 
1 
The above-entitled matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
Both parties are represented by counsel. 
The evidence shows that Officer Garth Davis of the Hailey Police Department stopped 
the Defendant for speeding at approximately 1 :06 a.m. on February 17,2008. Upon contact. with 
the Defendant, Officer Davis smeIled an odor of alcohol on the Defendant's person and observed 
glassy and bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. 
Officer Davis attempted to do field sobriety tests. The Defendant debated his 
circumstances with Officer Davis throughout the encounter. The Defendant repeatedly requested 
legal counsel or assistance. Officer Davis told the Defendant he was not entitled to such 
assistance. He eventually arrested the Defendant, ostensibly for "refusing to submit to 
evidentiary tests." 
The Defendant was transported to the Blaine County Jail. OEcer Davis both played him 
the advisory tape and repeatedly read him parts of the advisory form on breath testing. 
Throughout this procedure and afterward, the Defendant continued to ask for legal counsel or 
other assistance and was generally, though politely, uncooperative. He answered Officer Davis' 
M E M O R A N D U M  D E C I S I O N  A N D  O R D E R - \  
repeated requests for a breath test with equivocal answers, saying he would take the test but onfy 
wrth a witness or lawyer present. 
Officer Davis finally explained that he would obkn  a blood wanant. The discussion 
concerning counsel or other assismce continued. At 203 a.m., Officer Davis finally turned off 
an audio recording of this encounter, concluding that the Defendant had refused. 
Sg l .  Stewart of the HPD went and obtained the blood warrant for Officer Davis. Ln the 
interim, the Defend& continued to request legal counsel. At 2 2 5  a.m., Officer Davis left the 
Blaine County Jail to take the Defendant to St, Luke's Rospital. Consistent with the warrant, a 
blood draw occurred at around 3 :30 a.m. 
The Defendant was then transported back to the Blaine County Jail. The Defendant was 
uncooperative during the booking procedures, refusing to give an address or social security 
number until threatened with placement in the drunk tank. The Defendant findlly cooperated and 
was released on bond at around 4:40 a.m. 
The Defendant frames this case as a denial of the right to counsel or due process. If the 
Court understands his brief correctly, he asserts that he should have been given the right to 
consult counsel from the beginning, even on the issue of whether or not he should take the field 
sobriety tests. This is not the law. The right to consult counsel accrues when a person is subject 
to a custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966). A person being subjected 
to field sobriety tests is not subject to a custodial interrogation and does not have the right to 
consult counsel. See, e.g., State v. Hartwig, 112 ID 370,372-374 (Ct. App. 1987)'. 
Once arrested for DUI, a person likewise has no right to consult legal counsel on the 
issue of whether or not he should submit to breath testing. I.C. $1 8-8002(2); found constitutional 
' Other parts of Hartwig have been superseded by statute as recognized in State v. Howell, 122 ID 209 (Ct. App. 
1992). 
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in Matler ofMcNeely, 1 19 ID 182 (Gt. App. 1990). As a result, the only focus in the present 
case is wheher or not the refusal to allow the Defendant to consult with legal counsel until the 
blood draw was accomplished and he was released on bond somehow violated the Defendant's 
rights. 
In analyzing this issue, the Defendant first calls the Court's attention to State v. Madden, 
127 ID 894 (Ct. App. 1995). In Madden, the defendant was arrested for DUI, took one breath 
test and was turried over to the jail for booking. Prior to or during booking, the defendant 
requested an individual drug test and access to a lawyer. The defendant was told that she would 
first have to finish booking. She was denied access to a telephone until 2:30 a.m., 3% hours after 
her original stop and 1/2 hour after booking was completed. 
The defendant cdiled her lawyer and then requested a blood test. She was told she could 
get one after posting bond. The Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that: 
Under the facts of this case, the Blaine County Sheriff Department's policy 
prohibiting an anestee from making a telephone call until after the booking 
process denied Madden a meaningful opportunity to obtain an additional BAC 
test pursuant to I.C. 5 18-8002(4)(d). Consequently, the results of the breath test 
were inadmissible and should have been suppressed. Madden at pp. 895-896. 
Also relevant may be State v. Carr, 128 ID 18 1 (Ct. App. 1995). In Carr, the defendant 
was arrested for DUI and read the advisory form. She was also told that after taking a breath 
test, she could obtain her own test at her own expense. After taking the breath test, Carr was 
taken to a holding cell, where she repeatedly requested contact with an attorney. She was not 
permitted access to a phone for five hours. She then called a bondsman. Couching the 
circumstances as a violation of due process, the Idaho Court of Appeals ruled that "when a 
person is arrested for DUI and given an evidentiary BAC test, that person must be allowed, at a 
minimum, to make a phone call upon request to do so." Carr at p. 184. 
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As a result of these cases, there is little doubt that upon the campletion ofthe Sate's 
aLtempts to gather evidence in the present case, the Defendmt had the right to consult counsel 
and mmge for the gathering of exculpatory evidence. The question is whether or not that right 
was d a h l t y  delayed. 
As noted above, the Defendmt was stopped at approximately 1x36 a.m. It took 
approximately an hour to reach the conclusion that the Defendant was not going to take the 
breath test. Most of this delay was caused by the Defendant's refusal to cooperate2 and the 
police officer's patient attempt to m w e r  the Defendant's questions and advise him of his rights3. 
There is no evidence that the officer misled the Defendmt in any substanital way. There is no 
evidence that the officer was intentionaIfy engaging in any subsmtial delay. 
At approximately 3:30 a.m., the police had a blood draw perfomed on the Defendant 
pursuant to a warrant. Again, the delay, if any, in ob-g this blood draw can be attributed to 
the general lack of cooperation by the Defendant and the time it took to obtain the warrant and 
transport the Defendant to a medical facility. Moreover, the basis for the underlying warrant has 
not been challenged. 
The Defendant was then transported from the hospital back to the jail. He was booked 
into jail, though this process was apparently again delayed by the Defendant's refusal to give an 
address and social security number. Instead of contacting legal counsel, the Defendant 
apparently decided to contact a bondsman. The evidence does show that he bonded out of jail at 
4:40 a.m., a little over an hour after the blood test. 
* In addition to repeatedly asking for a lawyer, the Defendant, among other hngs ,  repeatedly claimed he did not 
understand the advice of rights form; asked for his friends to be present; discussed where he was stopped; 
apologized for speeding; discussed his inability to do field sobriety tests; and said he wasn't refusing tests while 
refusing to take tests. 
3 The police officer made multiple attempts to read and explain the advisory form to the Defendant. 
Madden involved a simtion where the defendant's m e s s  to a telephone was delayed for 
!h hour afler bbohng had been completed. Madden at p. 895. Garr involved a situation where 
the defendant's access to a telephone was delayed for as much as five hours from the time of 
arrest, where she had taken the breath test. Carr at p. 182. The present case is distinct from 
those cases because: 
1 .  The 2% hour delay between the Defendant's arrest and the blood draw was essentially a 
result of the Defmdmt's failure to reasonably cooperate, the necessity of obtaining a blood 
wmant and the requirement that the Defendant be transported to a medical facility. 
2. The time required to allow the Defendant access to a telephone after the blood draw was 
again delayed by the time necessary to transport the Defendant and his uncooperative behavior 
during the booking process. 
3. The actual time that he was allowed to make a phone call after the blood draw was 
completed is unknown. The only time known is when he was actually released. 
This is a close call because the case law makes clear that priority should always be given 
to a person attempting to preserve or obtain exculpatory evidence. At the same time, it does not 
give a person the right to unnecessarily delay an ongoing police investigation and then claim that 
he was prejudiced by that delay. The appropriate test is to look at the totality of the 
circmstances and determine if the police unreasonably delayed the Defendant's right to access a 
telephone and a lawyer. Under the circumstances noted above, where the delay was attributable 
to: 1) the Defendant's conduct, 2) the time necessary to obtain and execute the blood warrant and 
3) the time necessary to return the Defendant to jail and book him, the Court cannot come to the 
conclusion that the police acted unreasonably. 
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The Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED. The matter is SET FOR PRE-TRIAL 
CONFERENCE on Tabc 5 0 ,2008 at 2:00 p.m. w ~ t h  JURY TRViL SET for 
,2008 at 9:00 a.m. 
DATED June 
I I  
FIFTH DISWCT IMAGISTUTE .JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILlCNG 
I hereby certify that a copy of this Memorand 
hand-delivered to the following, postage pre-paid on 
2008 to wit: 
Rick Allington 
Attorney At Law 
1 15 Second Ave. South 
Hailey, ID 8333 3 
Brian E b  
Attorney At Law 
PO Box 766 
Ketchurn, ID 83340 
I 
MEMORANDUM DECISION A N D  ORDER 
S'I ATE OF IDAHO 
Plalnt~ll: 
VS 
Bradlej I) Green 
Defendant 
DOB: 
FIFTH JUBICIRL DISTIZIGT, STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF BLAn\fE, MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
1 
i 
1 PRE-nIAL STIPULATION and ORDER 
1 
1 Case No: CR-2008-00003 10 
1 
) 
The above-named parties hereby stipulate and agree as foliows: 
[ ] The Defendant will plead guilty ~ l s  charged to 
f ] The State moves to dism~ss the ckarge(s) of because 
( ] The partles have agreed to the following amendments: 
[ ] COURT TRIAL is set for at 
(By signing this document, all parties expressly agree to waiver of a jury trial.) 
l I/ JURY PRE-TRIAL Is set fo at 2:oo p.m. 
with JURY TRIAL set for at 9:00 a.m. 
[ ] The State recommends the following sentence: 
THE DEFENDANT IS NOTKFIED that: 
1 If you fail to appear at any tlme noted herein, any bond posted may be forfelted and a warrant may be ~ssued for your arrest. 
2 In agreeing to plead guilty, you watve all statutory and constitut~onal rights provided by law. if you have questions, you should consult 
legal counsel. 
3. Sentencing recommendations are not binding on the court 
DATED: /$ - - 3 ~  6 3  
Bradley D Green BnafiE-E.;Uctnt; (Defense Attorney if applicible) 
************************************************************************************************************************ 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Stipulation of the Parties is: I &Proved [ j Disapproved. 
SENTENCING (if applicable) is SET FOR at 
48 hours prior to Sentencing, Defendant must provide Court with: [ ] Substan 
FIFTH DISTRICT MAGISTRATE JUDGE # 
Copies hand-delivered t o h  Prosecuting ~ t t o r n c ~ h  Defense Attorney 
By: 
BMAN E. E L r n S ,  P.C. 
Aaorney at Law 
208 Spmce Avenue North 
P. 0. Box 766 
Ketchurn, Idaho 83340 
Telephone (208) 726-43 3 8 
Facsimile (208) 726-9328 
ISB No. 3150 
Anorney for Defendant I 
I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 ', 
BRADLEY D. GREEN, 
) 1 
) Plaintiff, Case No. CR-2008-00003 10 
1 DEFENDANT'S WATVER OF 






The above named Defendant, Bradley D. Green, hereby waives his right to a speedy trial 
I 
as guaranteed by provisions in the Idaho and United States Constitutions and Idaho Code fj 19- 1 
3501. 1 * DATED this -I L ~  day of July, 2008. 
APPRPPVED BY: 
DEFENDANT'S WAIVER OF RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL - \ i Page I 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEWBY CERTIFY that on the day of July, 2008, I caused a true and correct 1 
copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the foliowing in the method marked herein: I 
i 
v/- Mailed Frederick C. Allington 
Hand-Delivered City Prosecuting Attorney 
Faxed to 208-788-7901 1 15 Avenue South 
and mailed Hailey, ID 83333 
crim\green-speedpial-waiver. wai 
DEFENDANT'S WAIVER OF RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL (L 
BRIAN E. E L m S ,  P.G. 
AMorney at Law 
208 Spruce Avenue North 
P. 0. Box 766 
Ketchurn, Idaho 83340 
Telephone (208) 726-4338 
Facsimile (208) 726-9328 
E-mail: beelkins@cox.net 
ISB No. 3 150 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRI f 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 1 Case No. CR-2008-00003 1 
1 
v. ) MOTION TO RESET I 
1 AND PRETRIAL 




The Defendant, Bradley D. Green, by and through his attorney of record 
moves this Court for an order resetting the pretrial conference and jury trial, 
28 and July 3 1,2008, respectively, and that it be set for the August trial 
2008. 
This motion is based on the fan that at the pretrial conference on June 30, 2008 the 
indicated that it would set this matter for the August trial setting once the Court received a 




The prosecutor's office has been contacted regarding this request and it has no objehtion 
to the rescheduling. 1 1  1 1  I MOTION TO RESET JURY TRIAL AND PRETR~AL CONFERENCE; AND ORDER- \ 
i Page, I
I 
DATED this day of July, 2098. /' 
Based upon the foregoing motion and the proceedings that took place at the pretrial 
coderence on June 30,2008. along with the Defendant's Waiver of Right to Speedy Trial, the 
matter is reset for a pretrial conference on August 25, 2008 at 2:00 p.m. and a jury trial for 
August 28,2008 at 9:00 a.m. 
DATED this 2Y day of July, 2008. 
R. TED I S W L  
Magistrate Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25 day of July, 2008, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method marked herein: 
Mailed Frederick C. Allington 
Hand-Delivered City Prosecuting Attorney 
Faxed to 208-788-7901 1 15 2nd Avenue South 
and mailed Hailey, ID 833 33 
k Mailed Brian E. Elkins 
Hand-Delivered Attorney at Law 
Faxed to Fax Number P. 0. Box 766 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
cr~m\green-brad-resetTT.mot I 
! ! 
1 1  
MOTION TO RESET JURY TRIAL AND PETRLAL CONFEENCE; AND ORDER -2 Pagei2 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Pla~ntiE, 
VS. 
Bradley D Green 
Defendant 
FIFTH J U D I C W  DISmICT, STATE: OF IDmO 
C O W  OF B L m E ,  M A G I S m E  RIVfSJON 
1 .- .... J 
PRE-TRIAL STIP ;,<%A; 
i 
I 
1 Case No: CK-2008-00003 10 
) 
1 
The above-nmed parties hereby stipulate and agree as follows: 
[ 1 The Defendant will plead guilty as charged to: 
p(! The State moves to dismiss the chwge(s) of because 
[ ] The parties have agreed to the following amendments: 
[ 1 COURT TRIAL is set for at 
(By signing this document, a11 parties expressly agree to waiver of a jury trial.) 
[ 1 JURY PRE-TRIAL is set for at 2:00 p.m. 
THE DEFENDANT IS NOTIFIED that: 
I .  If you fail to appear at any time noted herein, any bond posted may be forfeited and a w a t  may be issued for your arrest. 
2. In agreeing to plead guilty, you waive a11 statutory and constitutional rights provided estions, you should consult 
legal counsel. 
3. ions are not binding on the court unless ex 
DATED: 
I 
Bradley D Green 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Stipul [ 1 Disapproved. 
SENTENCING (if applicable) 1s SET FOR 
48 hours prior to Sentencing, Defendant must 
.$ ~J&\'VLY 
Copies hand-delivered to: Prosecuting Anomey Defense Anorney [ ] Defendant 
By: 
RRTAN E. bNbrS ,  P.C. 
Atlnmcy ;ti T .ilw 
208 Splucc A v n ~ u c  North 
1). 0. Box 766 
Kctchum, 113 83340 
?'cIcpflot)c: (308) 726-4338 
hcs i t~~i lc :  (208) 726-9328 
E-mail: bcclkins@~cox.l~et 
Idilhr~ Stalc Bar No. 3150 
Allomcy for. Dcfcridatlt 
IN 711E DISTIIICT COURT 01: TliL;. EFTH JUDTGTAZ, DISTRICT 
01' M E  STATE OF IDAIIO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BT.AME 
Plainli rf, 1 1 Case No. CR 05-3 10 
V. 
) 
1 RULE 1 I AGUEMENT 






'lbc above named Plnialiff,  stat^ ofldalla, hy and through mc Misdctncanor Prosecuting 
A ttorncy for the City OF Hailuy, Frederick C. Alliiyton, hsrcby stipulates a31d agrccs with tho 
Defcndimt, Ilradlcy D. Grccn, by and thmugh his attori~cy, Brian E. EIkins, that Ihs criminal 
actioti tiow pondi~lg ~gaiitst tllc Dcfci~dant, captioned and nul~lbcrcd above, shall bo 
colt.~prorniseci ant1 fitializcd as follows: 
'I. -1.11~ Citation filcd in  this maitn; no. 23605, chargcs thc Dofendant in viokdtion i~unlbcr 
1, with Driving Whilc I j n d n  the Tnfluencc of Alcohol, a rnisd~memnor, in violati011 of jclsho 
C:odl: Scclion IR-$004 (First Offcnsc) and in violation number 2, it chargcs tllc Dcfcndant with 
SRPULA?'JON 1~OiZ LN'i'IEY 01: PLEA AND SENTENCTNG KEC'OMMENUA'flCSN 
PllliSi)ANT TO I.C.R. 1 l ((7)(I)m) - 1 
Rcsistieg, in violation oFXdaho Codc $1 8-705. 
2. Thu Stale agrees to dismiss violalion nulnbcr 2, Resisting, LC. $1 8-705, ilnd pursuallt 
to ldallo Criminal Kulc 11 (a)@), tllc Dofendant will enter a Coi~ditioonl Guilty Plea thereby 
rcsclvir~g thc right to appc~l ihe Magistrate's Mcmorantlum Decisioi~, filed Junc 4, 2008, llcnying 
fl.~c Defencti~fii's Morioll lo Suppress. The Dcfcl~ddant's cotlditiona) guilty plca will bc to the 
cilargc orDriv~rr$ While Undcs thc lllfiucncc o f  Alcohol, a first affcnsc, in violation of Idnho 
C:odc Soctions 1 8-8004 and 18-8005 ( I  ). 
If thc Dcrcndanl prevdls on appeal, thc Dchndwt shdl bc allowcd to withdraw his gtiilly 
pica enter pursuant hcrcto. Pursuant lo TMCR 6 (d), t f ~ c  Dcfmdant, by exccliting this Rule 1 1 
Agccmcnt enters n conditional guilly plea to the ckwgc ol'Driving While Ur.ldcr t l~c  lnftucncc of 
Alcohol, first offcr~sc, I.C. $$ 1 8-8004 Rt 8005 (a)(l). 
'I'lle Partics agrcc that ihc coiirl can accept the Dcfc~tdant's Condilioi~al Guilty Plea but 
111111 sc~ltct-ice: shalj not be i111poscd pcrlding the appeal to be taken by thc Dcfendml. The Partics 
agrac that il~e courl shall entcr an ordcr that will cornply with Idaho Appcllatc Rule 11 (c)(4) that 
will crreclivdy lcril~inntc this actio~l thereby creating an appealable ordcr. 
3. The 1)cfendant hcrcby acknowiedges the foliowing: 
a. He has heen represontcd by counscl througl~out his matter and ius specifically 
rcvicwetl a id  thorotrghly discussed this Rule 11 Agrecmcr.11 and its raznificatio~~s with h i s  
a tlonicy. 
b. 'fhc conditiorlal plca of guilly entered i i~  this mrzttc~ is in all rcspccts thc free 
anti volrinl~ry acl of the I3efendailt and is not the rcsult of any coercive influence, wllctl~cr 
ST1 PIJT ,AT] ON POK ENTRY OF PLEA AND SEN'L'ENCINO RECOMMENDATION 
PL'IRSUAN.1' 7'0 1,C.K. I 1  (d)(f)(U) - 2 
c. 'i'hc Defendant has ltccli fi~lly inronned by his counsel orthe consecluencos of 
(hc coilditioiial plca of guilty, iacluding thc mininmm and rnaxirnux~~ punish~l~cnts therefor, in the 
cvcnt scntctlcc is imposcd, and all otlicr direct mid iildiren consequences which niay apply. 
d. The Dofondant has heo:cn advised by counsel that by c13tering a ~oilditional 
guilty plca, and in the cvcnl hc Oocs not prevail on appeal, he would the11 have sente~lce i~nl,osed 
hy 1\11: courl, whether ii hr; a ji~dgment of convictioil or a witlrficld judgment tftcrcby waiving his 
right a%itrst cotnpuisoly self-incriminatio~1, provided tllc Dcfcudant may invoke the right to 
rcntai~t silcnt allout othcr crimes or about any infomalion tkat i~~ighf teed to increase tile 
~-)unishmcnt for the crirnc to which hc is pleading guilty, his light to a trial by jui.y, his right Lo 
carirront wjincsscs agni~lst him, the tight of the presumption o f  innocence a~lrl that i11e State must 
provc: his guilt beyonrl a I-casonablc doubt, Iiis riglat that a guilty verdict, or a not guiliy verdict, 
mt~st be bsscd upon the una~linious decision of the Tact finder, and he waives any and ail cfcfcnses 
lllrli he rtlay have. 'I'he Ihfendant also rr~~derstanrts tlmt 11e waives rights wl1icl.l otitcrwisc could 
hi~vc been riiscct at trial, inclurficlg the right to challenge the adxl~issibility of evidence upon 
whici~ thc Statc might have rclicd. 
c. 'I'llc l)efctlclant has bccn thoroughly informed of the nature of the cfiarlgcs to 
wlricft IIC will cntcr tiis coriditional plea aT guilty. 
f. 'rllc conditional plea cntcrcd in  this mattcr is in fact a result oCa pica 
agrcc~nct~t. Thc Defendant l~lldcrstartds that ths  Rulc 11 Agrccmc~~t concc~i~ing swltcl~cing is not 
bindirlg on the on the Court ~ n d  in the event the Court rejects the sentwlcing i.eco~nmenctations, 
STII'UT .ATION FOR F,NTIZY OF PI ,F.A AND SENTENCTNG RECOMMENDATION 
PUI<SLJAH'I''L'@ I.C.R. t t (d)(l)(B) - 3 
tllc ncrc'cndnrlt wotllcl bc unable to withclraw his plca of guilty ai~d hc could bc scntcncccl to Glc 
~ ~ ~ a x i r n t i m  aliowcd by Iirw which, for DUT is: six (6) months in the coullty jail a ~ r l  fincd in an 
ui~-~ouixt 11ot.t~ cxccecl$1QOO, or both, driviilg privjlcgcs srtspcnded Tor 180 days (with tllc first 30 
days bci~tg :rhsaltrlc wj th no cfriviug privileges whulsoevw) and other direct and indirect 
cnnscqucnccs which imy q~ply ,  
g. Tlrc Dere~~danl has been advised that if  hc is on probation or parolc for anotl~cr 
o/'Scitsc, this pica of guilty may collstitutc a violatioil of said probatioil or parolc a~d may slibject 
fhc T)cTc~ld;mI to additional pcnaltics; 
h. Thc Dcrctldant has been adviscd that if hc is not a citizcn of thc U~litcd States, 
his guilty plcn nrtzy lead to deportation or rcmoval from the United States ar may prevent him 
fi.0~1 nhli~i ning Icgal s talus or ciii ~~cnslxip n the U n i l ~ i  Stales; the Deknclant has bocn adviscd 
lllrit i rhc docs not speak tlie English lagtiage, inoludj~~g any handicap, tho co~~rt will appoint a 
qudlificd intcrprctcr to assist; 
i. t f appropriate, thc llcfe~~dailt may be required to malie restitution to any victims 
of this incitlcnt arlitlor rcimbursc thc state for certain costs of ulvcstigatioi~ and prosccutjon; 
4, 'This Slipulation sliall bc construed irt confoimmce with Icid~o Cril~~itial Rule I I 
(i)( 1 )(HI. 
5 ,  A1 thc: ti11xc ~Fscn:TIIcnci~l~, thc State agrccs to malcc the following sei~teucjny 
~ccort\m c~~clntio~ls: 
;z. the Dcfcl~dant scrvc 160 days in jail with I80 days suspelldtd and the DeTenda~rt bc 
plncccl 01.1 :In one ye:n ui~sup~rviscd probatio~l si~bjcct o the following tetms and conditions; 
-,. , .. Lvvw rli-w i 4 i i t i  I\UULI\ Ltnl3 I / D I i l f l l U  t"-LklNh PHK NU, ILCUtS iLbY3Ctl 
b. pay a fit~c in the arnotillt of $1,000 with $400.00 stlspcnded plus caurt costs, for a total 
t l r~c ;it tl-rc. time ofsor1tenci17g in Ihe timount o f  $630.50; 
c. The Duronclanl reccivc a witf~hcldjudgnlcnt; 
d. the De fenrfant's itriviny privjlegcs bc suspctidcd for 120 days; 
e. Obtain an alcohol svzrluation and follow thc ncorrimcndatiotls. 
ti, 'The pal-tics agrcc 1 1 1 ~  Dcfmdant shall bc lrcc to srguc ibr ally appropriate: sentence. 
7. It1 ibc cvcnt thc Defendant docs not prervail on appeal, and sentcmce is mtexd, 
iintl hc then succcssfiilly con~plctcs the terms md cotlditions of probation, tlre Deratdant will 
li~ovc tbc C o ~ ~ r i  p~rrs~runt lo Tdallo Codc Sectiorr 19-2604 for an ordcr scttii~g asidc and vacating 
his plca, that a not girilty plea be enlercif, setting aside and vacating Ihc Ordcr Withllolding 
Jilclgmcnl, tcmlinaling probation, bcing discharged fmm prbatiort, dismissing the case and 
cxptrr~ging all records, The State agrees to rccomrne~xi to the Court that such rclicfbc granted 
ant1 in such avcnl, thc Statc agrees that it would be "compalible with the p~lhlic intcrcst" alld 
"that thcm [would] no longer [be] caasc for co~ltinuing the p~riod of probatloit" atld that thc 
Dcfcndartt's rcqilcstcrf relief under Tclalto Code Section 19-2604(1) bc granted. 
10. 'The Pnt-ties agree tllal i f  the DeTenditnt makcs a satisf~1~tory sllowing under Tdjaho 
Cotlc Scctiott 19-2GU4(1), the Court shall enter an ordcr setting asidc and vacating the 
1)cfcndant's plca atld thc Order Withholding Judgtlmt, tcrmiuatting probation, discharging thc 
Dcfcrc-tldant from probatior-i, clisrniss the case and expunge all rccords. 
I I .  Thc Agrccmcnt sllall bc construed undcr, and intcrprctcd in accordance wilh, the 
Iztws of ttlc Slate 0fldal.10. 
S'fll'lJl.ATT0N FOR ENTRY Of: PLEA A3413 SENTENClNG RECOMMENDATFON 
I'UICSUAN-I' TO I.c:.R. t I (ti)(I)(n> - 5 
12, This Agreci71cnt shali bbid and inurc to tllc benefit of thc Parlies rcspcctive agents, 
successors, insur.ers, and agents, 
13. Tile Agreenlcnt may be execulcd In counteq3rcrls with fn~similc sigaatt~m, each 01 
wl~iclt sllnll he: Jeemal nn o~iginal, aild all of which together sl-ralf canstitutc one and the sftllle 
iustrument. 
14. in the event any provisia~l oCthis Agreen~cnt shall bc l-reld invalid or unmforccablc 
by any cotrrt of cnl-r~polorit jurisdiction, such llolding shall not iiivalidale or rcndcr unenforcciible 
i117y olhcr provisit~n hereof. 
DA'IRD this ..- (lay of " ", "-9 2008. 
DA'I'BO this -*, - day of Scptcnibex, 2008. 
Brian E. Ulkhls 
Attoxxey for Dcfcndant 
DATED this / D  day of . ,2008. 
/ 
12, Thrs Agecment shall bind and inure to the benefit of the Pmles Jrespecuvc agents. 
successor&. insurm, and agents. 
I 3. The Agreerne~~t may i x  exmuted in caunter13arts sviih fawsimile stgnatas,  tach of 
cvk,cb shali be deemed an original, rind all of which logather sshaff constitute one u t ~ d  the S a l e  
instran ent 
14. frt tile everit any provis~on of t h i s  Agwinent shall be held itrvalid or u~~rnfo~cabl.e 
by m y  corn of competent jurisdiction, such hcrldiag shall riot invalidate or render wenforceable 
arty othn provision hereof. 
DATED this /i?sy of y*-, 2008. 
Bradley D. Green! Def~daix  
DATED this day of' September, 2008. 
Attorney for Defendant 
DATED this day of  ,2008. 
Frederick C. Allington 
Prosearting AAttn~z~ey for the City of Mailey 
STPLrLATLUK FOR EN'IRY OF PLEA AXD Sf?;N?'mCINCi WCC~jCvIM~ZfATiUN 
PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 11 fa)(r)(B> - 3 
GERTXFI[GATE OF SERVICE 
1 H E B B Y  CERTIFY that on the day of 2 0 0 8 , I  caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing docment to be delivered to the following in the method marked 
herein: 
Mailed Frederick G. Allington 
Attorney at Law 
Hand-Delivered 1 15 2nd Avenue South 
Harley, TD 83333 ' Faxed to 788-7901 
Faxed and mailed 
.I 
STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF PLEA AND SENTENCING RECOMENDATION 





IN TECE D I S ~ ~ T  COURT OF FIFTH mI~IALeflsTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TEE COUNTY OF BL 
M A G I S T M E  DIVISION 





) Citation No: 23605 
Bradley D Green I 
PO BOX 460 
Kirkland, WA 98033 
Defendant. 
) Case No: CR-2008-0000310 
I 
I 
) CRIMINAL MINUTE ENTRY 
CHARGE: Driving Under The Influence LC. 118-8004 M -d i(5 * 
CHARGE: Officers-resisting Or Obstruct~ng Officers I.C.118-705 1 ,  bmn 
DATE: CD: hFf2 Counter: 8:59 
Judge: ] R. Ted Israel Clerk: Dy3 Paige Trautwein 
[ 1 Mark A. Ingram [ 1 Kate Riley 
[ ] Robert J. Elgee M Other: 
M Jason D. Walker 
&&' 
[ 1 Interpreter: 
[ 3 Other: 
Prosecuting Attorney: X~rederick C. AlIington 
Defense: 
[ ] No Attorney: 
Defendant appeared. 
Defendant did not appear. 
[ ] Bond revokediwasrant issued w/ new bond $ 
[ 1 State given 21 days to act. 
Defense ~ttorn&: ~ r i a n  E Elkins 
Procedure: Charge Amend d to: 
Guilty Plea 
[ 11 Court Satisfied reviews with ((a; counsel. a Agreement p v p d )  
2 1 Denies threats or force or under the influence. 
[ ] Reads and understands [ ]English [ ]Spanish [ ]as interpreted today 
[ ] Waives rightshas read, understood and signed Acknowledgment of Rights form. 
[ ] Understands penalties, including enhancementslsigned Notification of Subsequent Rights 
fom. 
[ 1 Understands that a guilty pIea/conviction may impact ability to remain in the United 
States if not a citizen. 
[ 1 Understands Court not bound by recommendations. 
[ 1 Admits elements of offens (factual basis). 
a court accepts pica. gm a / Ve t 
BRIAN E. ELKRVS, P.C. 
Attorney at Law 
208 Spruce Avenue North 
P. 0. Box 766 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Telephone (208) 726-4338 
Facsimile (208) 726-9328 
ISB No. 3 150 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE! OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
SUSPENSION OF THE DRIVER'S 
LICENSE OF 
BRADLEY D. GREEN, 
) Case Nos. CV-08-160 and CR-08-3 10 
BRADLEY D. GREEN, 
MOTION TO DISMISS THE 
Petitioner, STATE'S APPEAL FOR 
v. FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
COMES NOW the above named Petitioner, Bradley D. Green, by and through h s  
attorney of record, Brian E. Elkins, moves this Court for an order dismissing the State's Appeal 
Re: Magistrate's Order Dismissing BAC Hearing for failure to timely prosecute the appeal. 
MOTION TO DISMISS THE STATE'S APPEAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE - Page 1 
(1)  The record in this matter reflects that on March1 7,2008 the Order Dismissing 
BAC Rehsal, signed by Magistrate Judge R. Ted Israel on March 14,2008, was 
filed dismissing the BAC refusal proceedings. 
(2) On March 27,2008 Plaintiff/Appellant, State of Idaho, filed its Notice of Appeal 
Re: Magistrate's Order Dismissing BAC Hearing. 
(3) On March 3 1,2008 the Blaine County District Court filed its Order on Appeal 
Procedure pursuant to I.C.R. 54 indicating, inter alia, in paragraph 3 of said order 
that a transcript of the record of proceedings was to be prepared and that the 
Appellant pay the court reporter the estimated transcript fee of $200 w i h n  14 
days from the date of the order. 
(4) According to the Respondent's file in this matter, the Appellant took no M e r  
action and it does not indicate whether the Appellant paid the court reporter the 
fee for the transcript or made an effort to settle the transcript. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 54.13 provides, in part, that "Failure of a party to timely take any 
other step in the appellate process shal not be deemed jurisdictions [sic], but may be grounds 
only for such other action or sanction as the district court deems appropriate, which may include 
dismissal of the appeal." Comparable language is found in Idaho Appellate Rule 21. 
Also, by analogy, I.R.C.P. 41 (b) provides that a defendant may move for a dismissal in an 
action for the plaintiffs failure to prosecute. This rule imposes upon plaintiffs an affirmative 
duty to seek prompt adjudication of their claims. Magel v. Wagers, 11 1 Idaho 822, 721 P.2d 
1250 (Gt. App. 1986). 
Indeed the District Court in its Order on Appeal states in paragraph 1 1 that: "Failure to 
comply with any of the terms of this Order, or any additional requirements of I.R.C.P. 83, shall 
constitute grounds for automatic dismissal of the appeal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(s). 
The sanctions to diligently prosecute an appeal from the Magistrate's Division are 
discretionary with the District Court and in appropriate circumstances, dismissal may be a proper 
sanction for failure to file a timely appellate brief. See, State v. Langdon, 1 17 Idaho 15, 785 P.2d 
679 (Ct. App. 1990); Woods v. Crause. 101 Idaho 764,620 P.2d 798 (1980). In Langdon, the 
Court of Appeals found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing an 
MOTION TO DISMISS THE STATE'S APPEAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE - Page 2 
appeal for failure of the defendmgappellmt to timely file his appellmt's brief within 35 days. 
With the passage of nearly six months and the failure by the State to timely prosecute its 
appeal in this matter by getting even the transcript settled, should justifl a dismissal. Oral 
argment is respectfully requested. 
DATED this ay of Septemker, 2008. 
Attorney for Defendmfletitioner 
CERTIFICAE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of September, 2008, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method marked 
herein: 
4' 
Mailed Frederick C . Allington 
Hand-Delivered City Prosecuting Attorney 
Faxed to 208-788-7901 1 15 2"* Avenue South 
and mailed Hailey, ID 83333 
n 
MOTION TO DISMISS THE STATE'S APPEAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE - Page 3 
FlRh Judicial DirMct Court, State of Idaho 
In and For the County of Blaine 
201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 106 
Halley, Idaho 83333 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
vs ' 
Bradley D Grrsen 
PO Box 460 





Clerk % -t, 
Case No: CR-2008-00003 10 
C Jim Thomas, County P.A. 
C Angela Nelson, County P.A. 
C Man Fredback, County P.A. 
Frederick Allington, City P.A. 
Yp ~ t t o m e ~ &  , F.1 bias, 
C Defendant 
C Interpreter 
Date- Counter 1 :by CD&L\~ 
-- 
Charge : 
0 He&g Type%% 
B W  E. E L m S ,  P.C. 
Attorney at Law 
208 Spruce Avenue North 
P. 0. Box 766 
Ketchm, Idaho 83340 
Telephone (208) 726-4338 
Facsimile (208) 726-9328 
E-mail: beelkins@cox.net 
ISB No. 3 150 
Attorney for DefendantiAppellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH SUDIGLAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLADE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 Case No. CR-08-3 10 
Pf aintiffmespondent ) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL, 
V. 1 
BRADLEY D. GREEN, 
TO: The Respondent, State of Idaho and its attorney, Frederick C. Allington, City of Hailey 
Misdemeanor Prosecuting Attorney, 1 1 5 2nd Avenue South, Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Blaine County Clerk of the Cout  
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The title of the action is as above indicated; to-wit, State of Idaho v. Bradley D. Green. 
2. The title of the court which heard the proceedings appealed from and the name of the 
presiding magistrate: Blaine County Magistrate Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Honorable R. Ted Israel presiding. 
3. The number assigned to the action by the trial court: Blaine County Case No. CR 08- 
3 10. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
4. The title of the court to which the appeal is taken: Blaine County Distn.ct Court 
5. The appeal is taken upon matters of law and fact. 
6. The proceedings on the hearing were recorded and/or reported. The identification of 
the method of recording is a digital recording kept by the Blaine County Clerk of the Court and 
there exists an audio recording of the evidentiary hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
heard on May 14,2008, at 2:00 p.m. at the Blaine Couty Courthouse and is on file herein. 
7. A cegificate that the Notice of Appeal has been served on the Respondent is attached 
hereto. 
8. The Appellant, Bradley D. Green, by and through h s  attorney, Brian E. Elkins, 
appeals against the Respondent to the Blaine County District Court pursuant to Idaho Criminal 
Rule 54 and the Order Staying Proceedings on Appeal filed September 16,2008. Appellant 
seeks a review of the Magistrate's Memorandm Decision filed June 4,2008, denying 
DefendantlAppeIlant7s Motion to Suppress. 
9. The issues on appeal which the Appellant intends to assert: 
a. Wether the magistrate erred when it found that a driver suspected of driving 
while under the influence of alcohol does not have a right to call an attorney during a motor 
vehicle stop while the driver considers whether to submit to field sobriety testing; especially 
when said driver is incorrectly advised by the police officer that under Idaho's Implied Consent 
statute, a driver has given his implied consent to submit to field sobriety tests; 
b. Whether the Appellant's rights were violated when the police officer failed, 
and refitsed, to allow the Appellant an opportunity to call/consult with his lawyer after he was 
charged with refitsing to submit to a breath test for alcohol concentration up until the Appellant 
posted bond and bailed out of jail; 
c. Whether Appellant's rights to counsel were violated, as guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, for 
failure of the police to allow the Appellant to communicate with counsel, or provide reasonable 
means to do so from the time he was charged with a refusal under Idaho Code Section 18-8002 
until he was released from jail; to-wit, from 2:03 a.m. until 4:40 a.m on February 17,2008, when 
Appellant was released from jail; 
d. Whether Appellant's Due Process rights were violated as guaranteed by the 
14'h Amendment to the US Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution when 
the State prevented the Appellant from gathering exculpatory evidence, denied him the right to a 
fair trial, denied him the means to consult with counsel, and denied the means by which to obtain 
advice on whether to obtain in independent alcohol concentration test or gather other evidence of 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
not being under the influence of alcohol; 
e. Whether Appellant's blood tests results should be suppressed fkom evidence. 
DATED this 3q day of October, 2008. 
Agomey for Appellant Bradley D. Green 
f m E B V  CERTEY that on the day of October, 2008, I caused a true and 




Faxed to 208-788-7901 
and mailed 
Frederick C. Allington 
City Prosecuting Attorney 
1 15 2nd Avenue South 
Nailey, ID 83333 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Date: 1012812008 
Time: 1257 PM 
Page 1 of 1 




In The Matter Of The Suspension Of The Drivers 
Selected Items 
Hearing type: Motion to Dismiss 
Assigned judge: Robert J. Eigee 
Court reporter: Roxanne Patchell 
Minutes clerk: ANDREA 
Parties: Brian Elkins 
Rick Allington 
Minutes date: 1 Of2712008 
Start time: 04:32 PM 
End time: 04:48 PM 
Audio tape number: D l  51 
Tape Counter: 432 Court introduces cases, State vs. Bradley Green and State vs. Matilda Kling, Mr. Elkns 
present for deb, defs not present, State represented by Mr. Allington 
Mr. Elkins gives argument on motion to dismiss-Judge Israel made ruling on BAC case, 
State appealed decision, District Court issued orders on procedure, the orders were not 
followed by the State, gives case law, length of time since appeals were filed warrant 
dismissal of appeals 
Tape Counter: 436 
Tape Counter: 442 
Tape Counter: 448 
Mr. Allington responds-has handled several appeals, usually receives bill from the court 
reporter and he krwards the bill to the City for payment, in these cases he didn't receive a 
bill, not sure if procedure has changed, didn't read the Court's order carefully, requests 
cases not be dismissed, defendants are not prejudiced 
Mr. Elkins responds-no rule stating the State receives a bill or the bill starts the appellate's 
time to run, the orders state a transcript is necessary and it is the State's duty to make 
sure one is prepared, the order in State vs. Green states the appellate is to pay the court 
reporter $200 within 14 days 
Court gives ruling, the order in State vs. Green states the transcript fee of $200 must be 
paid to court reporter within 14 days, the fee wasn't paid, grants motion to dismiss appeal 
in State vs. Green 
Court gives ruling in State vs. Kling-the order was filed 1-30-08, doesn't state a specific 
fee or time to pay, reviews ICR 54.7, may be State's burden to get the estimated amount 
from the court reporter, can only conclude there is no estimated fee in the record, denies 
motion to dismiss in State vs. Kling, for future appeals it is the appellant's duty to get the 
estimate from the court reporter and pay it within 14 days 
Mr. Elkins will prepare both orders, reviews ICR 54.7 states the fee has to be paid within 
14 days of the filing of the appeal 
State responds 
Recess 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) Case No. CR2008-3 10 
PlaintifffRespondent, 1 
) ORDER ON APPEAL 
) PROCEDURE PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 54 




WHEREAS, a Notice of Appeal was filed in the above-entitled case by Brian E. 
Elkins, P.C., on behalf of the defendant, Bradley 5. Green, on October 24, 2008; and 
pursuant to I.C.R. 54, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That the appeal and cross appeal, if any, shall be determined upon the record and 
not as a trial de novo. 
2. That factual issue exists and a transcript of the record is necessary for disposition 
of the appeal. The Appellant shall pay to the Court Reporter the estimated transcript fee 
of TVVO HUNDRED DOLLARS ($200.00) within fourteen (14) days from the date of this 
Order. 
3. That appellant's opening brief shall be filed within thirty-five (35) days after the 
transcript has been settled pursuant to I.C.R. 54.15. Should the requirement of a 
transcript be waived pursuant to paragraph 2, appellant's opening brief shall be filed 
within thirty-five (35) days after the entry of such stipulation or Court Order waiving such 
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requirement. 
5. That respondent's brief in reply, or upon cross-appeal shall be filed within hhtenty- 
eight (28) days after the filing of appellant's brief. 
6. That appellant's rebuttal brief shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days after 
respondent's reply brief. 
7. That, within thirty (30) days after the filing of all briefs the matter shalt either be 
submitted to the Court for decision upon written stipulation or shall be brought on for 
hearing by either party at a regular law and motion day and in the same manner as a 
motion made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b). 
8. That failure to comply with any of the terms of this Order, or any additional 
requirements of I.C.R. 54, shall constitute grounds for automatic dismissal of the appeal 
pursuant to I.C.R. 54.13. 
9. The Clerk of the District Court shall serve copies of this Order upon all parties or 
their attorneys and upon the trial court transcriber. 
DATED this 28th day of October, 2008. 
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Ce&ificate of Service 
True and corred copies of the foregoing Order on Appeal Procedure Pursuant to 
1.C.R. 54 were served as noted below: 
Fredrick C. Allington 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
1 15 2"* Avenue South 
Haiiey, ID 83333 
Brian E. Elkins, P.C. 
P.O. Box 766 
Ketchurn, ID 83340 
Susan Israel 
Court Reporter 
201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 1110 




Dated this 28M day of October. 2008. 
&-' 
paigb Trautwein, Deputy Clerk 
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R'*l THE DISTNCT COURT OF THE FIFTH m I C I A L  DISTRTCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 33-E COUNTY OF BLADE 
LN T E  MATER OF T E  




BRADLEY D. GMW, 
1 
) 
-l Case No. CV-08- 1 60 
BRADLEY D. GRXEN, 
1 
1 










The Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the State's Appeal for Failure to Prosecute its appeal 
came before this Court on the 27th day of October, 2008 at 4:30 p.m. with the Petitioner being 
represented by his attorney of record, Brian E. Elkins, and the State being represented by 
Frederick C. Allington, City of Hailey Misdemeanor Prosecuting Attorney. Based upon the 
Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, the record in this matter, I.R.C.P. 83 and good cause appearing 
therefor; 
ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State's Appeal regarding the Magishate's Order 
Dismissing BAC He&ng is hereby dismissed for failure of the Stale to prepare a transcript as 
required in I.R.C.P. 83(uj and, in particuia, the Court's Order on Apped required that the 
Appellant, State of Idaho, pay the estimated cost of preparing the transcript in the amomt of 
$200 witfun 14 days which would have required payment by April 14,2008. 
With the passage of approximately seven months since the filing of the Court's Order on 
Appeal Procedure Pursuant to I.C.R. 54, and no action being taken by the Appellant, 
IT IS E W B Y  O m E W D  that the Appeal be DISMISSED. 
DATED this _Ilfi day of October, 2008. 
mtw 
ROBERT .T. ELGEE 
District Judge 
CERTIFICAE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3 ( day of October, 2008, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method marked 
herein: 
Mailed Frederick C. Allington 
7Hand-Delivered City Prosecuting Attorney 
Faxed to 208-788-7901 I 15 2nd Avenue South 
and mailed Hailey, ID 83333 
Mailed Brian E. Elkins 
Hand-Delivered Attorney at Law 
Faxed to Fax Number P. 0 .  Box 766 
Ketchurn, ID 83340 
crimtGREEEN-Ref-Appeal-Dismiss.Ord 
ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
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Appeal fiom the Magistrate Court of the 
Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Blaine 
HONORABLE R. E D  ISRAEL 
Magistrate Judge 
Brian E. Elkins 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0 .  Box 766 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Frederick C. Allington 
City of Hailey Misdemeanor Prosecuting Attorney 
1 1 5 2nd Avenue South 
Hailey, ID 83333 
(208) 726-4338 (208) 788-7802 
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I. STA TEMEm OF THE CASE. 
A. NA OF THE CASE. 
This case stems &om an incident that occurred on February 17,2008 when the Defendant, 
BradJey Green ("'Green"') was arrested by Hailey Police Officer Garth Davis for driving while 
under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"). During Officer Davis' investigation of the DUI, and 
subsequent arrest and blood alcohol testing procedures, Green requested that he be permitted to 
discuss his situation with an attorney. The primary issue on appeal concerns whether Green's 
due process rights as guaranteed by the Idaho and United States constitutions were violated 
because he was denied access to counsel, notwithstanding repeated requests, during the critical 
time when he refused to submit to a breath test at 2:03 a.m. up until the time that he was releasbd 
from custody, afcer posting bail at 4:40 a.m. Thw, this case questions whether the magistrate 
erred in denying Green's Motion to Suppress based upon State v. Madden, 127 Idaho 894,908 
P.2d 587 (Ct. App. 1995) and Sfate v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181, 91 1 P.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1996). 
B. THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDlNGS IN THE TRIAL COURT AND ITS 
DISPOSEION 
On February 17,2008 Green was issued a Uniform Citation by Hailey Police Officer 
Garth Davis and charged with, in Violation # 1, "DUI ReEusal" in violation of Idaho Code fi 1% 
8002(3 )[sic] and in Violation # 2, with Resisting, in violation of Idaho Code fi 18-705.' As will 
be analyzed in greater detail, Green initially refused a breath test but later submitted to a blood 
draw that was conducted pursuant to a blood warrant. In any event, Green, through counsel, filed 
an appearance in the case and entered not guilty pleas to the charges set forth in the citation. At 
'With respect to Violation # 1, the "DUI Refusal" with the cite of 18-8002(3) it is not, of 
course, a crime to refuse to submit to a breath test but it is, rather, a "civil" proceeding. Presurnahiy, 
at some point, the State will correct this mistake on the charging document. I. C. 18-8002 is 
Idaho's "Implied Consent" statute: The crime of DUI is set forth in 18-8004. 
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the same time, Green filed a Specid Notice of Appearance and Conditional Request for a Show 
Cause Hehng  pursmt to $ 1 8-8002(4)(b).2 Also, in the BAC refusal case, CV 08-1 60, Green 
filed a Motion to Dismiss, the details of which are more Eully set forth in his motion, and it was 
ultimately dismissed by the magistrate in an order filed Mar~h  17, 2008. 
The order dismissing the BAC refusal proceedings was appealed by the State but was 
ultimately dismissed by this Court on October 3 1,2008 for the State's failure to prosecute. 
With respect to the criminal action, Green filed a Motion to Suppress dated March 26, 
2008 which requested "an order suppressing evidence obtained by Officer Garth Davis of the 
Hailey Police Department on the grounds that it was illegally ob&ed in violation of the 
Defendant's rights as guaranteed by the Fourth, Fiflh, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and comparable provisions of the Idaho Constitution and all case lay 
interpreting the same. The theme of Green's Motion to Suppress was that his rights were 
violated when he was denied access to counsel, or the use of a telephone to communicate with 
counsel, throughout the entire investigation up until the point Green posted bail and was released 
from the Blaine County Sherips Department. 
An evidentiary hearing was held on Green's Motion to Suppress whereupon the parties 
submitted memoranda of law and on June 4,2008 the magistrate filed its Memorandum Decision 
and Order denying Green's Motion to Suppress. 
Subsequent to the magistrate's ruling, the parties entered into a Rule 11 Agreement 
whereby Green agreed to enter a conditional guilty plea to the charge of driving while under the 
influence of alcohol, 1 8-8004 and I 8-8005(1), and the State agreed to dismiss the charge of 
resisting and delaying a police officer. Through the Rule 1 1 Agreement, Green retained the right 
to appeal the magistrate's Memorandum Decision and Order denying his Motion to Suppress and 
on September 16,2008 the magistrate entered an Order Staying Proceedings on Appeal. On 
October 24,2008 Green timely filed his Notice of Appeal bringing the matter before this Court 
for appellate review of the magistrate's decision. 
'Unless otherwise noted, all references to statutes will be to those contained in the Idaho 
Code. 
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A e m s c ~ p t  was prepmed of the evidentiv h e h g  relative to the Defend&" Motion to 
Suppress that occwed on May 14,2008.' 
G. STA T E M E m  OF THE FA GTS. 
The mesting officer in this case is Garth Davis, employed by the Hailey Police 
Other thm his time as a reserve officer, Officer Davis had two and one-half years 
experience as a law enforcement office? and was POST certified in 2006 and received training 
on the edarcement and detection of Idaho's DUI laws! 
Officer Davis stopped Green's vehicle for speeding at approximately 1 :06 a.m. on 
February 17,2008 on Main Street in Hailey in the vicinity of Granite Street which is one block 
south of McKefcher Bo~levard.~ Green's vehicle was stopped for traveling 38 mph in a 25 mp5 
zone.' Officer Davis did not observe any other errant driving behavior nor had he received any 
third-party information about the Green vehicle: Officer Davis did not have an arrest warrant? 
The Green vehicle pulled over almost immediately near the vicinity of Granite Street.'' 
Officer Davis made contact with the driver, Green, and advised of the reason for the stop 
and noted the odor of alcohol coming from Green, that his eyes were glassy and bloodshot, and 
when asked, Green admitted to having one drink at the Mint Bar in Hailey." When asked, Green 
3References to the Transcript on Appeal from Magistrate Division on the evidentiary hearing 
conducted on May 14,2008 shall hereinafter be referred to as the "Tr." 
4Tr., p. 3, Ls. 24-25. 
51d., p. 4, Ls. 19-21; p. 5, L.l 
'Id., p. 8, Ls. 3-4,21-23; p. 9, L.1, Ls. 6-16. 
*Id., p. 9, Ls. 22-25; p. 10, Ls. 1-2. 
"Id., p. 12, Ls. 9-16. 
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appropriately produced his Was&@on &ver's license whereupon a license check was 
conducted by Oficer Davis and he s m o n e d  bachp. Officer Davis reapproached Green and 
requested that he exit his vehicle to perform what are commonly referred to as field sobriety 
tests. However, Oreen indicated that he wanted to contact counsel so that he could be advised 
what he shodd do. As found by the magistrate, the trial court fomd that "the Defendant 
repeatedly requested legal counsel or assistance. Officer Davis told the Defendant he was not 
entitled to such assistance. We eventually anested the Defendmt, ostensibly for "refusing to 
submit to evidentiary tests."" 
But Officer Davis also testified that he told Green that he was not entitled to counsel 
during the FSTs "because when [Green] signed up for his driver's license, Idaho had what's 
called an implied consent law."'3 
Officer Davis, thinking that FSTs were the evidentiary testing under the implied consent 
law, placed Green under arrest "for refusing to submit to evidentiary testing."14 Also, Officer 
Davis M e r  informed Green that the test that he was going to use for alcohol testing were the 
field sobriety tests.I5 
As portrayed in Defendant's Exhibit A, when Officer Davis was requesting Green to 
perform FSTs, Green would respond by saying that he would be happy to perform the tests once 
he was able to communicate with counsel. Officer Davis advised Green that he would not be 
permitted to communicate with counsel. According to Defendant's Exhibit A on the media timer 
at 1 :20, Officer Davis advised Green that if he would not perform the field sobriety tests he 
I2See, Memorandum Decision and Order filed June 4,2008, p. 1. 
I3See, Tr., p. 15, Ls. 20-24. 
'4LTd., p. 17, Ls. 23-25; p. 18, Ls. 1-6. 
15This incorrect information, conveyed by Officer Davis to Green, becomes very important 
when assessing whether Green's due process rights have been violated in conjunction with Green's 
repeated request to speak to counsel and the confusion that was created by Officer Davis' initial 
statements in this regard, then coupled with the Notice of Suspension Advisory information as 
required by 18-8002 and 18-8002A. All of tfvs information is contained in Defendant's Exhibit A, 
the CD recording. 
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would be placed mder mest for r e b i d  to tt&e evidentiary tests - and these evidentiw tests arp 
the FSTs," Green was placed wder mest at 1 :28 a.m. and transported a short d i m c e  to the 
Blaine County Sherips D e p m e n t  where Green was taken into the small room that housed the 
Intoxilyzer 5000 breath testing machine." Once there, Green continued to ask for an attorney." 
Officer Davis started the 15-minute observation period at 1 :39 a.m.'' 
The completion of the 1 5 - h u t e  waiting period2' would have been completed at 1 :54 
a.m. and Green was deemed to have refused to submit to the breath test by Oficer Davis at 2:03 
a.m.21 
During the deprivation period, OEcer Davis played fhe tape that read the information 
contained in the Notice of Suspension for Failure of Evidentiary Testing (advisory for 
$$ 18-8002 and 18-800214, Idaho Code) (hereinafter referred to as the "NOS Form") and the 
NOS Form is on file herein. On Defendant's Exhibit A, the tape that read the NOS Form is 
completed at 6:56. Shortly thereafter, at 7:20, Defendant's Exhibit A, Officer Davis reads the 
NOS Form to Green since Officer Davis felt that Green had a hard time understanding some of 
the language in the NOS Form - in particular, the implications of a suspension with a 
Washington-licensed driver and Green's repeated requests to talk to a lawyer. For example, once 
Officer Davis completed paragraph 3 on the NOS Form ("You do not have the right to talk to a 
16See, also, Defendant's Exhibit A, at 4:OO. "You stated when you signed for your license 
you would submit to evidentiary testing and the FSTs are evidentiary testing." 
18See, Defendant's Exhibit A, 1:33. 
I9Tr., p. 21, Ls. 21-25. 
20The Standard Operating Procedure - Breath Alcohol Testing Manual, Idaho State Police 
Forensic Services (Revised 12/2008, Effective Date 1/15/2009) defines, in the glossary, that the 
"waiting perioblmonitoring periobldeprivation period: Mandatory 15-minute period prior to 
administering a breath alcohol test, in which an oficer monitors the test subject." See, Manual, 
Glossary, p. i. 
ZITr., p. 22, Ls. 6-1 1. See, also, the Intoxilyzer print card, on file herein, which shows that 
a refusal was printed on the card at 2:03 a.m. and that the "subject refused to continue." 
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lawyer. . . .") Green asked OfEcer Davis to explain that psapaph as he had always been advised 
to request a l a v e r  if he ever found himelf in a siwtion such as this.22 Once Officer Davis was 
finished with the b r e a ~  testing procedures, Green was taken from the Intox room at the Blaine 
C o m ~  SherifPs Bep ent and was escorted a short distance into a conference room and the 
audio recording was stopped at that point.23 OEcer Davis then filled out an Affidavit in Support 
of Blood Wmmt. See, Defendmt? Exhibit B. A fellow officer transported the a d a v i t  in 
Support of Blood W m m t  to this Corn, at his residence, and the Blood Warrant was signed by 
District judge Robert J. Elgee at 2:44 a.m. 
It was not until 255  a.m. that Green was transported by Officer Davis from the Blaine 
County Sheriff's Department to St. Luke's Hospital south of Ketchurn. However, d h g  the 52 
minutes that Green was in custody with Officer Davis at the Blaine County Sheriff's Department, 
he continued to request access to a lawyer but was denied.24 Green continued to request the right 
to speak to counsel up until his blood was drawn at 3:30 a.m.25 Green bailed out of jail at 4:40 
a.m.26 
Officer Davis testified that it was his belief, based upon his training with the Hailey 
Police Department, that Green was not entitled to speak to a lawyer until he bailed out jail.27 
I1 ISSUES ON APPUL. 
A. WERE GREEN'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS NOT 
ALLOWED TO COMMUNCATE WITH AN ATTORNEY AFTER THE EVIDENTIARY 
PROCEDUIlE FOR ALCOHOL TESTLNG WAS COnIPPLETED UP UNTIL HE WAS 
RELEASED FROMJRIL? 
22See, also, Defendant's Exhibit A, for extensive discussions between Green and Officer 
Davis on the confusion created by the suspension of driving privileges for out-of-state licensed 
drivers. 
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C. SHOULD GREEN'S BLOOD TEST RBULTS BE SUPPIZESSED FROM EVIDENCE? 
III ARGUMENT 
A. G E E N  'S DUE PROCESS M G m S  WERE VIOLATED WHEN THE POLICE OFFICER 
REFUSED TO ALLOW GREEN TO COMMUNICATE WITH COUNSEL. 
The relevant times are as follows: 
(1) Green was stopped by Hailey Police Offrcer Garth Davis at 1 :06 a.m. for 
speeding. 
(2) Green was arrested at 1 :28 a.m. for refusing to submit to evidentiary testing. 
(3) Green was transported to the Blaine County Sheriffs Department and the 15- 
minute deprivation period started at 1 :39 a.m. and, thus, would be finished at 1 :54 
(4) Green was charged with a refusal at 2:03 a.m. and the evidentiary procedures for 
breath testing under the implied consent Iaw were completed. 
(5) An application for a blood warrant was sought and issued by The Honorable 
Robert J. Elgee at 2:44 a.m. 
(6)  Green was transported fiom the Blaine County Sheriff's Department to St. Luke's 
Hospital at 2:55 a.m. 
(7) A blood draw was performed on Green at 3:30 a.m. 
(8) Green was released from jail at 4:40 a.m. after posting bond. 
Idaho law is clear that a DUI suspect is not entitled to talk to a lawyer during the implied 
consent phase of a DUI investigation. Section 18-8002(2) provides that "such person shall not 
have the right to consult with an attorney before submitting to such evidentiary testing. " 
(Emphasis added.) Thus: aper either submitting to evidentiary testing, or refusing to submit to 
the test, a suspect should be entitled to consult with counsel, along with reasonable means to do 
so, if the suspect makes a request to communicate with an attorney. The decision on what type of 
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evidentiary test that will be given to a swpect is up to the police officer. In Re Grr$thsl 1 13 
Idaho 364, 744 P.Zd 92 (1987). Officer Davis requested that Green submit to a breath test and 
the c~tical  time within which the evidentiq procedure for the breath test under Idaho's implied 
consent law was completed occurred at 2:03 a.m. 
The X W o  Court of Appeals in Matrer ofMcJVeely, 1 19 Idaho 182, 804 P.2d 91 1 (Ct. App. 
1990, Petitionfor Review Denied 1991) viewed testing for BAC under the implied consent statute 
as an 'kvidentiq procedure." See, I d ,  119 Idaho at 187. Once that evidentiary procedure is 
completed, the sbwte's prohibition against consultation with counsel ends. For it must be 
remembered that during the subsequent efTorts to obtain a blood warrant, that was not done under 
Idaho's implied consent law but under a completely different procedure - a search of the 
Defendant's person under the F o d  Amendment - by drawing blood. Indeed, the time that was 
spent by OEficer Davis to obtain a blood warrant was not necessary since the Idaho Appellate 
Courts have concluded, beginning in 1989 with State v. Woolery, 1 16 Idaho 368,3 70,775 P.2d 
12 1 0, 12 12, that search warrants for DUI blood draws are not necessary so long as there is 
probable cause to take blood. More recently, the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. D i m  144 Idaho 
300, 160 P.3d 739, rearmed and concluded that a search warrant is not necessary under the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution nor required under Article I, Section 17 of 
the Idaho Constitution since the extraction of blood in a DUI investigation fit within an exception 
to the warrant requirement so long as the oEcer had a sufficient factual basis to draw blood. 
It is important to recognize the nuance, and the difference, that permits an evidentiary 
procedure for BAC under Idaho's implied consent law and a blood draw as permitted under the 
Fourth Arnendment and as more fully analyzed in State v. Diaz. They are based upon two 
different rationales. 
What this means, then, is that if the State is fkee to go about securing and seizing 
evidence, so should Green and his opportunity to do that commenced at 2:03 a.m . Certainly, 
during the time that Green was held in a conference room with OfEcer Davis fiom 2:03 until 
2:55 a.m., Green should have been provided the opportunity to communicate with counsel. 
This Court has previously considered this issue and has ruled that if a suspect requests to 
speak to an attorney after implied consent proceedings are finished, they must be honored. That 
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issue, decided by this Court, and ed on appeal is State v Madden, 127 ldafro 894,908 P.2d 
587 (Ct, App. 1995) where the defendant agreed to submit to the first smple on a brea& test, but 
refbsed to give a second smpIe and while being booked into jail requested an independent blood 
test and asked that she be allowed to speak to her aaomey. The jailer at the Blaine Comv Jail 
informed Madden that according to policy, she would have to wait until booking procedures were 
completed to make any telephone calls. Madden was arrested at 1 1 :05 p.m. and, the Opinion 
indicates, that at approximately 1 :00 a.m. the mesting o%cer received a call &om the jailer 
advising that Madden wished to obtain a blood test. The mesting or~cer ,  Charlie Riemann, 
informed the jailer that Madden would have to get to the hospital on her own and mange for the 
test. 
At approximately 2:30 a.m. and approximately three and one-half hours after she was 
originally stopped, and 30 minutes after booking was completed, Madden was allowed to 
telephone her attorney. After speaking to her attorney, Madden again requested a blood test and 
her lawyer contacted the jailer who requested that Madden be transported to the hospital which, 
at the time, was only blocks away, for a blood test. The jailer, once again, contacted Deputy 
R i e m m  to advise of the status and Deputy Riemann informed the jailer that Madden could get a 
blood test after posting bond. 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion does not disclose when Madden was released &om 
custody, nor does it discuss whether Madden ever made arrangements for a blood draw.28 
Madden's BAC result on the first sample showed .211. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Woolery, 1 16 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 12 1 0 (1 989) 
recognized an "inherent exigency" in DUI cases due to the destruction of evidence by the 
metabolism of alcohol in the blood. That inherent exigency applies to both parties - the State and 
the Defendant - and, in particular, Green was entitled to consult counsel to be advised on whether 
he should reconsider submitting to the breath test or be advised to make arrangements for an 
281t was obviously not relevant to the Court of Appeals in Madden and the Court did not take 
issue with failing to get a blood test. Green points this out as it appears the magistrate chided Green 
for not contacting counsel even though there was no evidence in the record whether he did, or did 
not, and that Green had decided to contact a bondsman. See, Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 
4. 
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independent blood test. 
By refusing her access to a telephone for approximately two hours after her 
initial request for an independent test and three and one-half hours after her 
arrest, the ofticers denied Madden a meaningful and timely oppo-Q to 
rnake her own mangements for an additional test. 
Stare v. Madden, 127 Idaho at 589. 
In its conclusion, the Madden court said: 
Under the facts of this case, the Blaine County Sheriff Department's policy 
prohibiting an mestee from making a telephone call until after the booking 
process denied Madden a meaningful opportunity to obtain an additional 
BAC test pursuant to I. C. $ 18-8002(4)(d). Consequently, the results of the 
breath test were inadmissible and should have been suppressed. 
Id, at 589 - 590. 
Thus, it can be seen from Madden that an important part of the decision in aErming the 
magistrate's decision was the failure to provide access to consult with counsel way before 
Madden was released from jail on bail. It was two hours after the arrest and shortly after the first 
breath test that Madden stated she wanted a blood test and to speak to her lawyer. There is 
helpN guidance in Madden on Green's issue that is squarely before the Court. 
However, another case decided by the Court of Appeals the same day Madden was issued 
C 
fkther solidifies the right of a DUI arrestee to communicate with counsel once such a request is 
made.29 State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181,911 P.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1996) involved a situation more on 
point to Green's case. Carr was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol and was 
transported to the police station. 
Before Officer McCloud conducted an evidentiary breath test, and while he 
was reading the standard police advisory form aloud to her, Carr requested 
access to a telephone in order to contact an attorney. Consistent with I. C. 5 
18-8002(2), McCloud informed Carr that she had no right to consult with an 
attorney prior to W i g  the breath test. McCloud also informed Carr that 
after taking the State's breath test, she could obtain an additional test at her 
own expense. Carr agreed to take the breath test, which yielded results of .20 
and .21. 
29Carr did not become final until March 8,1996 when a Petition for Review was denied by 
the Idaho Supreme Court. 
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McGloud then took Car  into a holding cell d*g w ~ c h  time Casr asked 
when she could speak to an attorney. McCIoud S o m e d  Carr that she could 
""make my phone calls as soon as the jail personnel were ready to let her 
make the phone calls." At some point, McGloud prepared the Unifom 
Citation, charging Carr with misdemeanor DUI, 1, C. $ 1  8-8004(1). McCloud 
then departed and C m  made several requests of other off~rcers to contact an 
aaomey . The officers denied her request. Approximately five hows after her 
arrest, Can was provided access to the telephone, and she contaGted a 
bondsman. 
Id., 128 Idaho at 182. 
The Opinion is silent as to whe&er Can ever made contact with an aaomey or made 
arrangements for some type of independent test. It is clear, however, that Carr did not request an 
independent test: only that she be able to call a lawyer. Carr filed a motion to dismiss the DUI 
charge based upon a violation of her Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the United 
States Constitution and that "she was denied the right to a fair trial." The magistrate denied the 
motion, Carr entered a conditional guilty plea, and the district court reversed. The case then 
proceeded to the Idaho Court of Appeals. 
The issue in Carr was whether her constitutional rights were violated when the state 
denied her request to telephone an attorneyfollowing the administration of the State's BAC test. 
(Emphasis in the O p i n i ~ n . ) ~ ~  Id., 128 Idaho at 183. In Carr, the district court, when reversing 
magistrate ruled that "Carr was prejudiced by the State's failure to allow her to gather her own - 
evidence concerning her blood alcohol level. The only evidence concerning her blood alcohol 
level is that which was gathered by the state. Therefore, the correct remedy is the suppression of 
the state's evidence which could have been contested by Carr had she been allowed to gather her 
own evidence of her blood alcohol level." In her motion to dismiss the DUI charge, Carr argued, 
inter alia, that she "was prevented from obtaining an independent blood test to prove her 
innocense." Thus, even though Carr had not specifically requested an independent blood test, 
30This is the point being made by Green, which was picked up and emphasized by the 
opinion in Carr, that although a DUI suspect cannot consult with an attorney during the implied 
consent procedure, once it is completed by either submitting to a breath test or refusing it, then the 
implied consent statute is completed and both parties are entitled to go about gathering independent 
evidence due to the "'inherent exigency" in DUI cases. 
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she did request m oppo-ly to consult with counsel and it was an implicit deduction in the 
Opinion that she would have been &vised to seek an independent test. 
Even though C m  raised a Sixth h e n b e n t  mgment, the Court of Appeals did not 
specifically adkess that claim but, rather, upheld the district COW'S decision to suppress the 
J 
evidence based upon due process claims. "'The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due 
process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the state's accusations." 
Id, 128 Idaho at 184. Again, not chiding Carr for failing to request an independent blood test, 
the decision htrned on her request to comunicate with counsel: the same as Green. 
The private interest afTected in this case is Carr's interest in procuring 
evidence which would challenge the results of the State's BAC test. By 
denying Can's access to a telephone for approximately five hours after her 
arrest for DUI, the State denied her the means by which she could establish 
her defense. As recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court, an "inherent 
exigency" exists in a DUI setting, due to the destruction of evidence by 
metabolism of alcohol in the blood. State v. Foolery, 11 6 Idaho 368,370, 
775 P.2d 121 0,12 14 (1 989). Therefore, the only opportunity for a defendant 
in a DUI case to gather exculpatory evidence is within a reasonable time 
following arrest and the administration of the state's BAC test. See, Tacoma 
v. Heater, 67 Wash.2d 733,409 P.2d 867, 871 (1966). (denial of right to 
contact attorney following issuance of citation for DUI prevented defendant's 
effective preparation of defense because "evidence of intoxication dissipates 
with the passage of time."31) 
As a result, when a person is arrested for DUf and given an evidentiary BAC 
test, that person must be allowed, at a minimum, to make aphone call upon * 
request to do so. Such contact provides the means through which the arrestee 
is able to gather evidence intending to refute the state's evidence of 
intoxication and thereby preserve the "right to a fair opportunity to defend 
against the state's accusations." Chambers, supra. For example, the person 
contacted by the arrestee could facilitate the administration of an independent 
BAC test, a right guaranteed by I. C. $ 18-8002(4)(d). Indeed, many states 
have held that due process requires that a DUI defendant be afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to obtain an independent blood test as such test 
assures the defendant's right to gather exculpatory evidence. [Citations 
omitted.] 
311nterestingly, Tacoma v. Heater, supra, cited with approval by Carr, the Washington 
Supreme Court, en banc, found that a DUI suspect had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel and 
similar protections under the Washington Constitution after anival at the jail. 
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Allowing an individual arrested for DUT to make a telephone call once the 
state f i ~ s t e r s  its eviden'ciw BAC test ensures that arrestee will be given 
the o p p o d v  to obtain exculpatoxy evidence. Indeed, without timely 
access to a telephone, there is little likelihood of successfully challenging the 
state's evidence of intoxication. 
Id., 1128 Idaho at 184 - 185. 
Accordingly, based upon the Court's holding in Cam, Green's due process rights were 
violated when he was denied access to communicate with counsel despite repeated requests to do 
so. The only distinguishing feature between Green and Carr is that Carr agreed to submit to the 
requested BAC test and Green refused. As explained earlier, this distinguishing feature is of no 
moment. n e  critical step that must be completed is the implied consent procedures and those 
are completed by either the suspect agreeing to submit to the BAC test or the suspect refusing. 
Once done, the implied consent statute's prohibition against communication with c o w e l  ends 
and the defendant's due process rights are put in place. It makes no difference if he agrees to 
take the breath test or refuses, either way, once that final step has been @en, the defendant has 
the right to commicate with counsel if he makes a request to do so. 
Especially in this case, there were not any justifiable reasons to prohibit Green from 
communicating with counsel while he sat in the conference room at the Blaine County Sheriffs 
Department from 2:03 a.m. until 255 a.m. If allowed to do so, Green's communication with 
counsel would not, in any way, have disrupted or delayed the State's investigation and the 
unnecessary delay caused by the State in securing a blood warrant. 
Furthermore, as the Carr case indicates, an independent test is not limited to a blood test 
or breath test. 
In addition, as noted by Carr, the person contacted by the arrestee could 
arrange for a photograph to be taken to demonstrate that the arrestee's eyes 
were not bloodshot but clear and white; prepare a tape recording to 
demonstrate t k t  the arrestee had clear speech; video tape the arrestee to show 
that he or she has balance and is able to walk in a straight line; perform a gaze 
nystagmus test to show smooth eye pursuit at all angles; or simply serve as 
a witness to observe the aforementioned characteristics of sobriety. As 
demonstrated, the interest affected in this case is substantial. 
Id., 128 Idaho at 184-185. 
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""Therefore, a detainee's opportunity to gather excdpatory evidence in such cases lasts 
only a short time follouing the mest and afinistration of the state's resting." State v. 
Can~elf, 139 Idaho 409,80 P.3d 345 (Ct. App. 2003). 
B. THE MGISTMITE E;RRED IN DENYING GrREEN '3 MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
The magistrate found in its Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 4: 
1. As a result of these cases [Madden and Carr], there is little doubt that 
upon completion of the sbte's aaempts to gather evidence in the present case, 
the d e f e n h t  had the right to consult counsel and arrange for the gathering 
of exculpatory evidence. 
The magistrate erred when it held that the defendant's right to communicate with counsel did 
not attach until the state completed its gathering of evidence: Clearly, that is not the law under State 
v. Carr. As noted above, the due process right to communicate with counsel attaches once the BAC 
evidentiary procedures under the implied consent law have completed so long as the detainee 
requests to speak with counsel. 
Otherwise, as can so clearly be seen Erom the circumstances in Green, if he is not allowed 
to communicate with counsel until he is released Erom jail at 4:40 a.m., then the entire thesis and 
holdings of Madden and Carr would be eviscerated. In particular, the State would not have 
suffered any type of delay or impediment during the time between 2:03 a.m. - when the implied 
consent BAC evidentiw procedures were completed - and the time that Green was transported 
to St. Luke's Hospital at 255 a.m. And, also, Green submits that he should have been allowed 
to communicate with counsel once he arrived at the hospital before blood was drawn at 3:30 a.m. 
and the intervening time thereafter up until he was released from jail. 
It must be remembered that the State does not have the right to draw blood under the 
implied consent statute if the officer elects to use a breath test. The only time a second 
evidentiary test can be conducted under the implied consent statute is if the circurnstances under 
18-8002(10) exist, the circumstances of which were not present in Green's case. Rather, the 
State's ability to obtain a blood draw is allowed under a different legal basis as more l l l y  
explained in State v. Diaz. To reiterate, if the State is free to go about gathering incriminating 
evidence during this critical time of "inherent exigency" then the Defendant must be allowed, 
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under the due process clauses, to seek out his own excdpatory evidence. 
2. The magistrate erred when it concluded that. "It took approximately an hour to reach 
the conclusion that the defendant was not going to take the breath test. Most of this delay was 
caused by the defendant's refusal to cooperate and the police officer" patient aeempt to answer 
the defenht 's  questions and advise him. of his rights." See, Memorandm Decision and Order, 
p. 4, para. 2. 
By conside~ng the relevant times of the stop, arrest, transportation to Blaine County 
Sherips office, the starting of the 15-minute depfivation period and the time on the Intoxilyzer 
card, and by listening to the audio recording on Defendant's Exhibit A, the magistrate erred in 
reaching these conclusions. 
Green should not be faulted for making the effort to understand and exercise his legal 
rights in wanting to seek the advice of counsel. Especially when considering the incorrect 
information being given by Officer Davis about the implied consent law and that the evidentiary 
test was going to be the field sobriety test. Stopped at 1 :06 am., arrested at  1 :28 a.m., 
transported to Sheriffs Department and 15-minute deprivation period started at 1 :39 a.m., 
completed at 1 :54 a.m. and refusal at 2:03 a.m. - Green did not cause a delay. 
3. The magistrate erred when it concluded that "at approximately 3:30 a.m., the police 
had a blood draw performed on the defendant pursuant to a warrant. Again, the delay, if any, in 
obtaining this blood draw can be attributed to the general lack of cooperation by the defendant 
and the time it took to obtain the warrant and transport the defendant to a medical facility." Id. 
Based upon the Idaho Supreme Court's holdings in State v. Wbolery and State v. Diaz, 
and contrary to what the magistrate found in this case, the delay was caused by Officer Davis in 
applying for a blood warrant that was not even necessary. Green also takes issue with the 
magistrate's statements that there was a general lack of cooperation by Green when, clearly, at 
that point he was entitled to cornxnunicate with counsel but it was refused by Officer Davis. 
4. All of the findings made by the magistrate on page 5 of the Memorandum Decision, 
as explained above, do not comport with the actual facts and the law and paragraph 3 of the 
Memorandum Decision and Order, page 4, is not a relevant consideration under Carr. It does not 
matter if the detainee does not call a lawyer once they are allowed to use a telephone. 
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5 .  At page 5 of the Memorandm Decision and Order the Magistsate observed that 
"This is a close cdl because the case Iaw m&es sure that prioriv should always be given to a 
person aeemptkg to preserve or obtain exculpatory evidence. At the same time, it does not give 
upersnn the rigfit to unnecessarily delay an ongoing palice investigation and then claim that he 
was prejudiced by that delay. " Pmphasis added.) 
Close calls are not decided in favor of the State but rather should be made to uphold a 
defendant's rights. The only mecessary delay in this case was caused by Officer Davis' refusal 
to allow Creen to tdk to a lawyer a d  then the critical time that was wasted by going about 
obtaining a blood warrant that was not necessary, 
Finally, the magistrate makes a couple of comments about how Green delayed the 
booking process once they returned from the hospital because he refusled to give his social 
security number. One can see that based upon the current state of affairs, Green was probably 
justified in refusing to offer up his social security number but it appears that Green did give that 
information without much delay. While at the booking window, Officer Davis apparently had a 
discussion with the jailer that if Green did not give his address and social security number, they 
"would throw him in the drunk tank until he could remember that information." Once that 
discussion occurred, Creen quickly remembered the information and there is no evidence that 
Green was thrown in the drunk 
C. THE APPROPUTE REMEDY FOR THE YIOUTION OF GREEN'S DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS TOULD BE SUPPRESSION OF THE STATE'S BLOOD TEST RESULTS. 
In the event this Court agrees with Green's analysis and finds that the magistrate 
committed reversible error, then the appropriate remedy under Madden and Carr would be 
suppression of the State's blood test results and other evidence of Green's alleged intoxication. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is Green's position that his due process rights and his right 
to a fair trial as guaranteed by both the United States and Idaho constitutions were violated by the 
32See, Tr., p. 26, Ls. 23-25; p. 27, Ls. 1-6. 
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State's failure to provide resonable means to contact cornsel after 2:03 a.m. on Feb 17, 
2008. Consistent therewith, Oreen respectfully submits that the magisQate" order denykg his 
motion to suppress be reversed and that not only the results of the State's blood draw be 
suppressed but, as Judge Lansing points out in her Specially GoncMng Opinion in State tt. 
Carr, all other evidence and observations of Green's intoxication made by any State agent be 
suppressed; i.e., odor of alcohol, slurred speech, glassy, bloodshot eyes, demeanor, balance and 
dexteriq allegedly displayed at the scene up until the time he was released from custody at 4:40 
a.m. 
WSPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /O day of February, 2009. 
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FACTS 
The State defers to the findings of fact contained in the Magistrate Court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order dated June 4th, 2008. In particular, the 
Magistrate's finding that the delays, between when the Green was initially 
stopped until his Blood was drawn, were attributable to the uncooperative 
behavior on the part of Green. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On review of a decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence, 
the Court employs a split standard of review. The Court will defer to the trial 
court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Hawkins, 131 
ldaho 396, 400, 958 P.2d 22, 26 (Ct. App. 1998). However, the Court exercises 
free review over the application of constitutional standards to those facts. 
ISSUE 
Whether a suspect in a DUI investigation is entitled to speak with an attorney 
prior to the completion of the investigation. 
ARGUMENT 
Under ldaho law, it is settled that a person is not entitled to an attorney 
prior to submitting to an evidentiary test. The Courts have held that the period 
prior to submitting to the test is investigatory and not a critical stage of the 
criminal proceeding. State v McN~ely, 119 ldaho 182 (Ct. App. 1990). The 
Defendant cites two cases: State v Carr, 128 Idaho 181 (Ct. App. 1996) and 
State v Madden, 127 ldaho 894 (0. App. 1995) for the proposition that he should 
have been allowed to contact his attorney after he had refused the offered breath 
test. 
The one distinguishing fact separating the present case from State v Carr, 
128 ldaho 1 81 (Ct. App. 1 996) and State v Madden, 1 27 ldaho 894 (Ct. App. 
1995) from Carr and Madden is the agreement by the motorists to submit to 
evidentiary testing. Green, on the other hand refused to submit to any testing. 
From the audiotape of the arrest and subsequent exchange in the intox room at 
the Blaine County Sheriff's Office, Green engaged in conduct designed to stall 
and prolong the attempt by Officer Davis to obtain a breath sample. 
In Madden and Carr, the suspects had submitted to evidentiary testing and 
once done, the officer's investigation was essentially complete. Green's, stall 
tactics delayed the process to such an extent, that by the time blood was drawn 
at the hospital, 2.5 hours had passed. Had Green submitted to evidentiary testing 
as is required by law, he would have had ample time to call his attorney, bond 
out and obtain an independent test.' At 2:03 am, what evidence did the State 
have against Green? He refused to submit to field sobriety tests, and he refused 
to submit to a breath test. It was not until 3:30 am that the state had any evidence 
' Green was stopped at 1 :06 am and marked down as a refusal at 2:03. A blood warrant 
was obtained and it took an hour and a half (3:30 am) for the blood to be drawn. Green 
was bonded out at 4:30 am after being transported back to the jail from the hospital. 
for Green to refute with additional tests. I.C. Ij 18-8002A only provides for the 
opportunity for additional testing. Until 3:30 am, there was no test. 
There is no evidence in the record to suggest that officer Davis or the jail 
staff unreasonably delayed or denied Green his right to an attorney after the state 
was through with its investigation. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record to 
suggest that Green requested an additional test. Therefore, the actions of Green 
were the principal cause of any delay and should not be attributed to the State. 
When deciding whether Green's due process rights have been 
violated, this Court, like the Magistrate Court, needs to weigh the delay in 
obtaining access to an attorney against the conduct of the motorist. In doing so, 
the fault for the delay falls squarely at the feet of Green. And as a consequence, 
the delay in contacting his attorney lies with Green as well. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the aforementioned arguments, the Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress should be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 10th day of March, 2009. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby ceaify that on the day of May, 2008, 1 served a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing document upon the atrtorney named 
below in the manner noted: 
Brian E. Elkins, Esq. 
Post Office Box '766 
Ketchurn, Idaho 83340 
By causing copies of the same to be deposited in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid, at the post office at Hailey, Idaho. 
By causing copies of the same to be hand delivered to the office of the 
above attorney at his office located at 
x By causing copies of the same to be telecopied to said attorney at his 
telecopier number: 726-9328. 
\ 
IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF T E  FIFTH JUDICIAL, DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDMO,  IN AM) FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
S T A E  OF IDAHO, 1 





BRADLEY D. GFEEN, 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the 
Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Blaine 
HONORABLE R. TED ISRAEL 
Magistrate Judge 
Brian E. Elkins Frederick C. Allington 
Attorney at Law City of Hailey Misdemeanor Prosecuting Attorney 
P. 0. Box 766 1 15 2nd Avenue South 
Ketchm, ID 83340 Hailey, ID 83333 
(208) 726-4338 (208) 788-7802 
Attorney for DefendantlAppellant Attorney for PlaintifYRespondent 
The brevity of the Respondent's Brief is somewhat surprising and most of the arguments 
simply adopt the wist ra te 's  dings:  it appears that the Respondent" Brief was written before 
receipt of the Appellant's Brief. The Respondent does not take issue with, nor respond to, any of 
the factual records carefully set out by Creen in the Appellant's Brief. The Respondent merely 
echos the magistrate's findings that any of the delays were caused by Green's "uncooperative" 
behavior. However, and it is urged that this Court listen to Defendant's Exhibit A - the CD 
recording - even the magistrate agreed that Green was polite d ~ g  his encounter with Officer 
Davis. As spelled out in the Appellant's Brief, one cannot be deemed "uncooperative" when a 
suspect, as politely as possible, is making an effort to exercise a constitutional right to consult 
with a lawyer. 
Under the "Argument" of the Respondent's Brief, page 2, the Respondent makes this 
statement: "The Court's have held that the period prior to submitting to the test is investigatory 
and not a critical phase of the criminal proceeding" and the Respondent cites State v. McNeely. 
Along with how the Respondent framed the issue in its Brief, its argument is also erroneous. The 
McNeely court found that a DUI suspect was not entitled to speak to a lawyer because of Idaho's 
implied consent statute, I. C. 8 18-8002 not because of a Sixth Amendment right which requires 
a critical stage in the proceedings; i.e., the filing of a criminal complaint. 
Next, the State tries to distinguish Green's case from Carr and Madden by suggesting that 
they are different because Green refbsed to submit to evidentiary testing for blood alcohol 
content. However, in Madden, she actually reiksed to submit to a second sample after giving one 
sample. Madden then requested a blood test and asked to speak to her attorney. 
However. Green has already addressed that this argument being made by the State in his 
Appellant's Brief, see, pp. 1 1 - 14. 
The Respondent argues that Green was not entitled to an attorney until "after the State 
was through with its investigation." See. "ISSUE," p. 2, R. Br.; p. 4, R. Br. That is not the law 
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under Carr md Madden. If that were true, then the hol&gs in Madden and Carr would be 
eviscerated and the police could always take the position that they were merely "investigating" 
the case and the suspect was not entitled to an attorney. Once the State completed 18-8002 
procedwes - the implied consent statute - then Green was entitled to speak to an attorney upon 
request to do so. 
To reiterate, and to point out once again the holding in State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 1 8 1, 184, 
91 1 P.2d 774 (Gt. App. 1995): 
The private interest affected in this case is Carr's interest in procuring 
evidence which would challenge the results of the State's BAC test. By 
denying Carr access to a telephone for approximately five hours after her 
arrest for DUI, the State denied her the means by which she could establish 
her defense. As recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court, an "inherent 
exigency" exists in a DUI setting, due to the destruction of the evidence by 
metabolism of alcohol in the blood. State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370, 
775 P.2d 12 10,12 14 (1 989). Therefore, the only opportunity for a defendant 
in a DUI case to gather exculpatory evidence is within a remonable time 
following arrest and administration of the State's BAC test. See, Tacoma 
v. Heater, 67 Wash. 2d 733, 409 P.2d 867, 871 (1966) (denial of right to 
contact attorney following issuance of citation for DUI prevented defendant's 
effective preparation of defense because "evidence of intoxication dissipates 
with the passage of time"). (Emphasis added.) 
As a result, when a person is arrested for DUI and given an evidentiary BAC 
test, that person must be allowed, at a minimum, to make a phone call upon 
request to do so. Such contact provides the means through which the arrestee 
is able to gather evidence tending to refitte the State's evidence of 
intoxication and thereby preserve the "right to a fair opportunity to defend 
against the State's accusations." Chambers, supra. For example, the person 
contacted by the arrestee could facilitate the administration of an independent 
BAC test, a right guaranteed by I. C. 18-8002(4)(d). Indeed, many states 
have held that due process requires that a DUI defendant be afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to obtain an independent blood test as such a test 
assures the defendant's right to gather exculpatory evidence. See, e.g., 
Bilbrey v. State, 53 1 So.2d 27 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); McNutt v. Superior 
Court ofstate ofAriz., 133 Ariz. 7,648 P.2d 122 (1982); Brown v. Municipal 
Court ofLos Angeles, 86 Cal.App.3d 357, 150 Cal. Rptr. 21 6 (1978); Jones 
v. State, 200 Ga. App. 666, 409 S.E.2d 251, 253 (1991); Scarborough v. 
State, 261 So.2d 475 (Mrss.1972); State v. Swanson, 222 Mont. 357, 722 
P.2d 1155 (1986); State v. Bumgarner, 97 N.C. App. 567, 389 S.E.2d 425, 
426 (1990); Lakewoodv. Waselenchuk, 94 Ohio App.3d 684,641 N.E.2d 767 
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(1 994); Slate v. Choate, 667 S.W.2d 1 1 1 (Tem.C~m.App. 1983). 
In addition, as noteddy Can, the person contacted by the arrestee could 
arrange for a photograph to be taken to demonskate that the mestee" eyes 
were not bloodshot but were clear and white; prepare a tape recording to 
demonstrate that the mestee had clear speech; virleo~pe the mestee to show 
that he or she has balance and is able to walk a straight line; perfom a gaze 
nystawus test to show smooth eye pwsuit at d l  angles; or simply serve as 
a witness who observed the aforementioned chasacteristics of sobriety. As 
demom&ated, the hterest affected in this case is subsmtial. 
Analyzing the second factor articulated in Mathews, we conclude that the 
existing procedure, which denies an individual arrested fox DUI access to a 
telephone upon request until well after alcohol in the bloodstream has 
dissipated, causes a great risk of erroneous deprivation of the arrestee's 
interest in obtaining evidence in his or her defense. Moreover, as described 
above, the probable utility of additional or substitute procedural safeguards 
is also great. Allowing an individual arrested for DUI to make a telephone 
call once the State administers its evidentiary BAC test ensures that the 
arrestee will be given the opportunity to obtain exculpatory evidence. Indeed, 
without timely access to a telephone, there is little likelihood of successfully 
challenging the State's evidence of intoxication. 
The third factor articulated in Mathews, the government's interest, including 
"the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail," also supports our conclusion that Can 
was denied due process. The State has failed to demonsbate any reason for 
refbsing to allow Carr to call her attorney until several hours after 
administration of the State's BAC test. In addition, the fiscal and 
administrative burden of allowing those who are arrested and tested for DUI 
to make a telephone call is minimal. Thus, applying the three factors 
articulated in Mathews, we hold that Carr was denied her right to due process. 
The State also argues, however, that "Carr, under 1. C. Ij 18-8002(4)(d), could 
have availed herself of the opportunity for additional testing had she only told 
Officer McLeod that she wished to have additional tests performed. She 
literally slumbered on her statutory right. . . ." The State does not suggest 
how this additional test would have occurred in light of the fact that the 
officers did not permit Carr to use a telephone for any purpose. The State's 
argument is unconvincing, if not specious. 
Finally, the State contends that even if the officers' actions were improper, 
Carr cannot demonstrate that she was thereby prejudiced. The State asserts 
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that in light of the fact that the breath tests revealed a BAC of .20 and .2 1, it 
is doubfil that an independent blood test would have provided Can: with 
excdpatory evidence and that it is mere "qeculation" to wess what evidence 
would have been obtained b d  C m  been p e ~ ~ e d  to call an attorney. 
While it is true that as a result of the officers' actions we may only speculate 
as to what evidence, if any, Carr's attorney would have been able to gather 
in Carr's defense, we disagree with the State's suggestion that the results of 
the BAG test render the State's hpropgety hmless .  It has been established 
that a defendant has the right to challenge the accuracy of the test results 
ob&ed by the h t o ~ e t e r ,  the device used by the State to test Carr's blood 
alcohol content. See, Sface v. Hopkins, 11 3 Idaho 679,747 P.2d 88 (Ct. App. 
1987); State v. Harh~ig, 112 Idaho 370, 732 P.2d 339 (Gt. App. 1987). 
Moreover, I. C. 9 18-8002(4)(d) clearly contemplates that those arrested for 
DUI may exercise their right to obtain an independent test. Therefore, we are 
not of the opinion that simply because the results of the State's BAC test 
operate to the State's advantage, the arrestee's right to gather exculpatory 
evidence may be eviscerated. 
Based upon a review of this language from Carr, it is clear that the State's argument that 
Green was not entitled to talk to an attorney while the State did its "investigation" is misplaced. 
As Green has been arguing, once the State completed its BAC testing procedures under the 
Implied Consent Statute, I. C. fj 18-8002, based upon the inherent exigency that existed he was 
entitled to speak to an attorney based upon his repeated requests to do so. If the State is fiee to 
go about gathering evidence, then Due Process requires that the accused be allowed to do the 
same. 
By way of example, and by analogy, consider this other setting, albeit based on a Fifth 
Amendment protection, through Miranda, but nevertheless an argument being made by the State 
that it was still investigating its case and formal charges had not been filed. On June 23, 1990 
Mitch Odiaga was arrested at approximately 3:30 a.m. and after having his Miranda rights read 
to him, Odiaga "invoked his right to counsel." 
However, police officers repeatedly questioned Odiaga without providing an 
attorney. The public defender requested access to Odiaga from the morning 
of June 23d until appointed by a magistrate to represent him on June 25&. 
Prior to this incident, all local police agencies were notified by letter that Mr. 
Elkins would be taking public defender appointments during June 1 990. The 
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letter also demanded, under I. G. $ 19-853(a)(2), that Mr. Elkins be 
d e d i a t e l y  notified if my suspect vvithout his or her own aftomey was 
detained for questioning. 
125 I&o 389. 
Before the district corn, the State argued that Odiaga was not entitled to an 
attorney even though he was in a "custodial interrogation" type setting because they were 
still kvestigating the case and that Odiaga was not entitled to an attorney until formal 
charges were filed, thus implicating the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constiation. That argument was flatly rejected by the district court finding that Odiaga 
had a Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Mranda and applicable cases decided by 
the Idaho Supreme Court. 
In Mr. Green's case, the State has put forth the argument that Green was not 
entitled to an attorney based upon a Sixth Amendment type argument and that they were 
entitled to continue "investigating" their case because of the "uncooperative" behavior 
and efforts to stall being made by Green. The Respondent has missed the issue raised by 
Green and the existing law which rejects the Respondent's position. Invoking the right to 
counsel was not an uncooperative stalling tactic that was being taken by m e n  but, rather, 
the exercise and use of a constitutional right. 
CONCLUSION 
The validity of Respondent's arguments and points can best be summarized by its 
conclusion where it states that "the Defendant's Motion to Suppress should be denied." 
Like the other arguments being made by the Respondent, that is not the proper remedy 
that can be issued by this appellate court. This Court can either affirm the magistrate's 
decision or reverse it. This appeal is not a de novo review and, thus, t h~s  Court cannot 
deny the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. That has already been done by the magistrate. 
Green respectfully requests that this Court reverse that decision. 
RESPECTFULLY 
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I E E B Y  CERXFY fiat on the day of April, 2009, I caused a true and 
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Date. 6/8/2009 
Time: 04:05 PM 
Page 1 of 2 
Fifth Judicial Distdct Court - Blaine County 
Minutes Report 
Case: CR-2008-0000310 
Defendant: Green, Bradley D 
Selected Items 
User: ANDR64 
Hear~ng type: Oral Argument on Appeal 
Assigned judge: Robert J. Elgee 
Minutes date: Mi10812009 
Start time: 02:17 PM 
Court reporter: Susan israel End time: 03:14 PM 
Minutes clerk: ANDREA Audio tape number: d l  82 
Prosecutor: Frederick C. Allington 
Defense attorney: Brian E. Elkins 
Tape Counter. 2 17 Court introduces case, def not present, Mr. Elkins present on behalf of deflappellant, State 
representing respondent 
Court has reviewed the file, read the briefs filed and Judge Israel's dec~sion 
Mr. Elkins begins his argument on appeal, notes to the Court the CD of the incldent is on 
file, this is a DUI case, def was stopped by Officer Davis for speeding, officer asked def to 
perform FSTs and def said he would do the tests but wanted to call h ~ s  attorney first, 
describes the conversation between the def and Officer Davis re: tests, def was 
subsequently arrested 
Mr. Elkins reads portion of Judge Israef's decision, def was arrested for DUI and refusal 
18-8002, def asked for a lawyer, officer told the def he wasn't entitled to a lawyer pursuant 
to Implied consent, def was arrested, def was taken to the sheriff's office, def said he 
would take the breath test but wanted to see a lawyer first, cites case law, believes def 
was entitled to speak wl a lawyer after completing the evidentiary tests, the officer stated 
the FST's were evidentiary tests 
Court comments-the statute refers to evidentiary testing as blood, breath or urine, not 
FSTs, ornayone could just take the FSTs and not have to give breath, blood or unne 
sample 
Mr. Elkins agrees, but the def didn't know this, he has an outsf-state license, def was 
arrested, watched the ALS tape, def said he would take the test but wanted to speak wi 
his lawyer first, Officer Davis stated def wasn't entitled to a lawyer, def was then taken to a 
conference room, Officer Davis filled out an affidavit for a blood draw and another officer 
took it Judge Elgee's house for his signature, blood was taken at 3:30 a.m. 
Tape Counter- 236 Mr. Elklns cites case law State vs. Carr, requests all evidence be suppressed, reviews 
findlngs by Judge Israel, at 233 a.m. the implied consent law was finished and def should 
have been able to call a lawyer; Officer Davis' attempts to answer def's quest~ons were 
wrong and misleading, requests Court reverse Magistrate's decision 
Tape Counter 248 State responds-def was pulled over for speeding, refused to do field sobriety tests, Judge 
Israel decided the def was stalling, the State believes the def was also stalling, Officer 
Davis has no evidence for the DUI, the hospital requires a blood warrant bemuse they 
don't like to force people down for a blood draw, depending on how much someone has 
had to drink their alcohol level will either go up or down over time, this case is not like 
Fadden, Mr Green did not cooperate at all, Officer Davis was well within his rights to get a 
blood warrant, doesn't believe def should be able to start obtaining exculpatory ev~dence 
before the officer has any.euidenc~, In the Carr and Fadden cases the defs d ~ d  not refuse 
the FST's, requests the Court affirm the Magistrate's declslon 
Date. 6/8/2009 
Time: 04:05 PM 
Page 2 of 2 




Defendant: Green, Bradley D 
Selected Items 
Tape Counter: 255 Mr. Elkins responds-Mr. Irylingtan's argument of why the hospital needs a blood warrant is 
not part of the record, in State vs. Diaz a blood warrant is not legally required 
Court respondbboth sides' arguments are not part of the record, issue was brought up by 
Mr. Elkins by stating the warrant wasn't required and the State's response is the hospital 
requires it, there is no evidence in the record of either side of this argument 
Mr. Elkins continues-def should have been allowed to call his lawyer since they sat in the 
conference room for an hour waiting for the warrant, requests the Court listen to EXH A 
Tape Counter: 300 Court gives ruling-preliminary issues, the Court cannot state if blood warrant is necessary 
or not, there is a 3rd party, the hospital, that may or may not require warrants to do forced 
blood draws, maybe a liability issue, the reason for the arrest and the officer's meaning of 
evidentiary tests didn't compel def to give up more evidence than he wanted to, reviews 
the issues in this case, once the evidentiary test if done then the person has a right to wll 
their lawyer 
State agrees 
Mr. Elkins doesn't agree 
Court reviews State vs. Can, believes it supports this statement, comments on the issues 
in this casmnce there is a refusal the def can call their lawyer, the defs and State's rights 
are then even 
Mr. EIkins notes for the record, not agreeing with the 2 step process in which the Court is 
analyzing the issues 
Court is following State vs. Can, if there is a reasonable basis for the officer to request a 
blood draw then the State gets to complete this process before the def gets to obtain 
exculpatory evidence, this is mentioned 3 times in State vs. Carr 
Court will prepare an order 
Tape Counter: 314 Recess 
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1 ) ORDER ON APPEAL 
) 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Following oral arguments on June 8,2009, and for the reasons stated on the 
record, the district court affirms the magistrate's June 4,2008 Memorandum Decision 
and Order. This matter is remanded to the magistrate's court for further proceedings. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
Dated this 7 day of June, 2009 
Robert S.%lgeK 
District ~ u d i e  
Order -- 1 
I m E B Y  CERTIFY that on tlus [b day o&%O9, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing ORDER, document by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the foliowing: 
Rlck Allhgon 
1 15 2"d Ave S 
Wailey, ID 83333 
Brian E l h s  
PO Box 766 
Ketchm, ID 83340 
.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Wand Delivered 2 
- Overnight Mail 
- FAX 
&.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
- Hand Delivered 
- Overnight Mail 
- FAX 
d .S. Mail, Postage Prepaid - and Delivered 
- Overnight Mail 
- FAX 
Deputy Clerk 
Order -- 2 
B W  E. E L W S ,  P.C. 
Aaomey at Law 
208 Spruce Avenue No& 
P. 0. Box 766 
Ketchw, Idaho 83340 
Telephone (208) 7264338 
Facsimile (208) 726-9328 
e-mail: beeW@mx.net 
L- 
~ o ~ n  Drag@, C/@& ~iettllct 
Court Blains County, Idaho 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
BRADLEY D. GWEN, 
) Case No. CR-08-3 10 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
TO: The Respondent, State of Idaho and its attorney, Frederick C. Allingtoq City of Hailey 
Misdemeanor Prosecuting Attorney 
Blaine County Clerk of the Court 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Under Idaho Appellate Rule ("IAR") 17, the above named Appellant, Bradley D. 
Green, appeals against the above named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court 
from the Order on Appeal filed June 10,2009, the Honorable Robert J. Elgee, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Page 1 
D i s ~ c t  Judge, p ~ s i b g .  
2.  That the Ap~relliurt has a right to a p p d  to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the order 
described in p h (1) above is an appealable order p m w t  to IAR 
1 l(c)(lO). 
3. A p r e l m  - m a t  of the issues on apped which the Appellant intends to 
assert in the appd ;  provided, any such list of i s m s  on appeal shall not prevent 
the Applimt h m  a s s e e g  other issues on appeal. 
(a) Metfier the district court erred in 
Memormdm Decision and Order filed June 4,2008 denying the 
Appellant's Mo~on  to Suppress; 
(b) Whether the district court erred when it based its decision on matters not 
in the record; 
(c) We&= the magistrate erred when it found that a driver suspected of 
driving while under the influence of alcohol does not have a right to call 
an attorney d h g  a motor vehicle stop while the driver considers whether 
to submit to field sobriety testing; especially when said driver is 
incorrect~y advised by the police officer that under Idaho's Implied 
Consent shtute, Idaho Code $18-8002, a driver has given his implied 
consent to submit to field sobriety tests; 
(d) Whether the Appllant's rights were violated when the police officer 
failed, and refused, to allow the Appellant an opportunity to cail/consult 
with a lawyer after he was charged with refusing to submit to evidentiary 
testing for alcohol concentration up until the Appellant posted bond and 
bailed out of jail; 
(e) %%ether Appellant's rights to counsel were violated, as guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 
13 of the Idaho Constitution, for failure of the police officer to allow the 
Appellant to communicate with c o ~ ~ ~ l ,  or provide reasonable means to 
do so from the time he was charged with a refusal under Idaho Code $18- 
8002 until he was released from jail; to-wit, from 1 :28 am. until 4:40 a.m 
on February 17,2008, when Appellant was released from jail; 
( f )  Whether Appellant's Due Process rights were violated as guaranteed by 
the 14" Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, 
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Section 13 of the Idho Conaitution when the State prevenkd the 
AppelIaslt from gahering exculp~tov evidene, denied him the right to a 
f& trial, denied him the means to consult with counsel, and denied the 
means by which to obtain advice on whether to obtain an indgtendent 
alcohol concawtion test or gather otber evidence of not being under the 
influence of alcohol; 
(g) W&a Appellant's blood tests results and any other evidence of indicia 
of htoxication (slurred speech, bloodshotlglassy eyes, hpaired memory, 
w e d y  balance) should be suppressed from evidence. 
(h) Any other issues proper2y asserted once a complete review of the record 
and transcript is conducted. 
E-fas an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? If so, what 
portion? 
Response: No. 
(a) Is a Reporter's Transcript requested? 
Response: Yes. 
(b) The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the 
Reporter's Transcript: The reporter's standard transcript as defined in IAR 
25(c) supplemwted with the district court's comments, colloqies, decision 
from the bench on June 8,2009, aflkning the magistrate's Memorandum 
Decision and Order filed June 4,2008; the reporter has already prepared a 
Transcript on Appeal fkom -strate Division regarduy: the Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress, heard on May 14,2008, and the Appellant requests 
that Transcript be part of the record on appeal. 
The Appellant requests a standard record pursuant to IAR 28 fb) plus any exhibits 
offered into evidence at the Defendant/Appeilant.'s motion to suppress held on 
May 14,2008, before the Honorable R. Ted Isml.  
I certiQ: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set 
out below. 
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@) (I) The Clerk of the D i s ~ c t  Court has been paid the e s b t e d  fee for 
prepmtion of the Rqofier's 
(2) The estimated fee for prqmtion of the Clerk's record has been 
paid in the aomt of $100. 
(c) Under LQR 23(a)(8), no filing fee is r e q ~ d .  
(d) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
DATED this 1 5 day of July, 2009. 
n 
ATTORNJ2Y FOR APPELLANT BRADLEY D. GREEN 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15 day of July, 2009, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method marked herein: 
Mailed Frederick C. AIlmgton 
Hand-Delivered City of Hailey Misdemeanor 
Faxed to 208-788-7901 Prosecubrig Attorney 
Faxed to 208-788-7901 1 15 2& Avenue South 
and mailed Hailey, ID 83333 
miled Susan Israel 
Hand-Delivered Blaine County Court Reporter 
Faxed to P. 0 .  Box 1379 
Faxed to 
and mailed 
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EXHIBITS 
Appellant's Exhibits: 
May 14, 2008 Motion to Suppress 
A. Audio Recording of Traffic Stop 
B. Toxicology Discipline Evidence Submittal Form 
Transcript on Appeal From Magistrate Division, Filed December 11, 2008 
The above list includes all exhibits offered or admitted in the trial or 
proceeding of this matter. They are being forwarded to the Supreme Court in 
their original form. 
Dated this I, , day of August 2009 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Supreme Court No. 36723 
) 
PlaintifflRespondent, ) 
1 CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
VS. ) 
) 
BRADLEY D. GREEN, ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS. 
County of Blaine ) 
I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
Clerk's Record on Appeal was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, full and 
correct Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of 
the Idaho Appellate Rules as well as those requested by the Appellant. 
I do further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause 
and exhibits requested by the Appellant will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
along with the Clerk's Record on Appeal and the Court Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. 
IN WITNESS WHFSEOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court at Hailey, Idaho, this day of %&* , 2009. 
Jolynn Drage, Clerk of the Court 
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I, Crystal Rigby, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record and 
Court Reporter's Transcript to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
Brian E. Elkins, P.C. 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 7636 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Attorney General's Office 
CRIMINAL APPEALS 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ldaho 83720-0010 
Attorney for DefendantIAppellant Attorney for PlaintifflRespondent 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, nto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of the said Court this? \, day of , 2009. 
JOLYNN DRAGE, Clerk of the Court 
BY 
Crystal Rigby, Deputy (blerk 
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